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FROM CARLIN’S SEVEN TO BONO’S ONE:  
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION’S REGULATION OF THOSE 
WORDS YOU CAN NEVER SAY ON 
BROADCAST TELEVISION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1961, the new chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) gave a speech to the National 
Association of Broadcasters that became famously known as “The Vast 
Wasteland” speech.1  In a brave move, Chairman Newton Minow 
challenged the broadcasters in attendance to watch their own channels, 
free of distraction.2  He warned the broadcasters that they would find a 
vast wasteland: 
 You will see a procession of game shows, violence, 
audience participation shows, formula comedies about 
totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder, 
mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, Western badmen, 
Western good men, private eyes, gangsters, more 
violence and cartoons.  And, endlessly, commercials—
many screaming, cajoling and offending.  And most of 
all, boredom.  True, you will see a few things you will 
enjoy.  But they will be very, very few. And if you think 
I exaggerate, try it.3 
More importantly, Chairman Minow challenged the broadcasters to 
remember that they were accountable, not to the financial shareholders, 
but to the shareholders of the airwaves—the viewing public.4  He also 
noted that children spend as much time watching television as they do in 
school, and accordingly asked the broadcasters, “Is there no room on 
television to teach, to inform, to uplift, to stretch, to enlarge the capacities 
of our children?”5 
In 1978, the Supreme Court echoed Chairman Minow’s concern for 
children when it held that the broadcast media’s pervasiveness and 
accessibility to children warranted applying lesser First Amendment 
                                                 
1 Newton N. Minow, Speech Before the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 
1961), reprinted in Television and the Public Interest, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 395 (2003). 
2 Id. at 398. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 399. 
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scrutiny to the regulation of broadcast indecency.6  This decision, in 
response to George Carlin’s famous Seven Words You Can Never Say on 
Television monologue, established that expletives should not be broadcast 
on the public airwaves.7 
Three decades later, the Parents Television Council (“PTC”) released 
the results of an exhaustive study that analyzed instances of foul-
language on the broadcast airwaves during primetime.8  Compared to 
1998, the PTC found that nearly twice as many expletives were aired 
during primetime network television during 2007.9  In addition, the PTC 
found that “harsher” forms of expletives were used, such as variations of 
“fuck” or “shit.”10  These results appear to support Chairman Minow’s 
vast wasteland and demonstrate a need for the FCC to regulate such 
content.11 
In the years since Chairman Minow’s speech, the FCC has become 
more active in cleaning up the vast wasteland via indecency regulation.12  
Responding to highly publicized instances of fleeting indecency on 
broadcast television, the FCC in 2004 changed its indecency policy so 
that variations of the words “fuck” and “shit” would be considered 
indecent per se.13  However, the FCC may not presume that variations of 
                                                 
6 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (finding that the ease of access and 
government’s strong interest in the well-being of youth justified special treatment of 
indecent broadcasting).  The iconic Carlin, who is remembered for his comic and “furious 
social commentary,” died at age seventy-one on June 22, 2008.  Mel Watkins & Bruce 
Weber, George Carlin, Comic Who Chafed at Society and Its Constraints, Dies at 71, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 2008, at C12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/24/arts/24carlin. 
html?pagewanted=1&_r=1#. 
7 See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (holding that Carlin’s monologue was indecent in 
the broadcasting context); Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM) 
(Pacifica Complaint), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975) (declaratory order) (articulating an indecency 
policy in response to the broadcast of Carlin’s monologue). 
8 Press Release, Parents Television Council, PTC Finds Increase in Harsh Profanity on 
TV (Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://parentstv.org/PTC/news/release/2008/1029.asp.  
The Parents Television Council analyzed all primetime television entertainment programs 
broadcast on the major networks between 1998 and 2007.  Id. 
9 Id.  The PTC recorded 11,000 expletives in 2007.  Id. 
10 Id.  (“Not only are harsher profanities like the f-word and s-word airing during hours 
when children are likely to be in the viewing audience, but they are airing with greater 
frequency.”).  The PTC found that in 1998, ninety-two percent of expletives on broadcast 
television could be categorized as “mild.”  Id.  In 2007, seventy-four percent of the 
expletives were categorized as “mild,” while nearly a quarter of the expletives were a form 
of fuck, shit, or bitch.  Id.  In 2007, half of the instances of the variations of “fuck” were 
broadcast during the 8:00 p.m. viewing hour.  Id. 
11 See infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the PTC study to rebut critics of 
FCC indecency regulation). 
12 See infra Part II.B (discussing the creation of an indecency policy). 
13 See infra notes 76–84 and accompanying text (summarizing the changes to the FCC’s 
indecency policy).  See generally Katherine A. Fallow, The Big Chill?  Congress and the FCC 
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“fuck” and “shit” are presumptively indecent without violating the 
Constitution.14  In addition, because of the recent litigation questioning 
the validity of the FCC’s per se prong of its indecency policy, it is unclear 
what policy standards must be followed.15  Thus, the FCC must revise its 
current indecency policy to continue protecting the public’s convenience, 
interest, and necessity, to remedy the constitutional problems with the 
FCC’s indecency policy, and to protect broadcasters’ free speech by 
putting them on clear notice of what type of content should be avoided.16 
To this end, Part II provides a background of the FCC’s regulatory 
history and scheme, including Congress’s mandate that the FCC regulate 
in the public interest, convenience, and necessity, with a focus on 
indecency policy.17  Part III argues that the FCC’s new fleeting indecency 
policy is unconstitutional, but that the FCC must still regulate broadcast 
indecency for the public convenience, interest, and necessity.18  Part IV 
proposes a new indecency policy that provides clearer guidelines.19 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Part II provides a background of the FCC’s regulatory history and 
scheme, focusing on its indecency policy.20  Congress created the FCC to 
regulate the broadcast spectrum.21  Since its creation in 1934, the FCC has 
exercised its powers according to the public convenience, interest, and 
                                                                                                             
Crack Down on Indecency, COMMC’N LAW., Spring 2004, at 1 (illustrating the publicity and 
action taken following the 2003 Golden Globe Awards and 2004 Super Bowl Halftime 
show). 
14 See infra Part III (discussing the unconstitutionality of fleeting indecency policy). 
15 See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted and vacated, 129 S. Ct. 
2176 (2009) (remanding in light of Fox v. FCC); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 
444 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S.Ct. 1647 (2008).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Fox v. FCC and heard oral arguments on Nov. 4, 2008.  Transcript of Oral Argument, 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1647 (2008) (No. 07-582), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-582.pdf.  
The main issue on appeal was whether the FCC had adequate reasoning for changing its 
indecency policy.  Id.  See Courtney Livingston Quale, Note, Hear an [Expletive], There an 
[Expletive], But[t] . . . the Federal Communications Commission Will Not Let You Say an 
[Expletive], 45 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 207, 251 (2008) (providing a summary of the oral 
arguments); infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court’s 
decision).  See also infra notes 86, 91 (discussing the Administrative Procedure Act and the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard). 
16 See infra Part IV (proposing new policy). 
17 See infra Part II (discussing the statutory creation of the FCC and its regulatory 
history). 
18 See infra Part III (discussing validity of justifications and unconstitutionality of fleeting 
indecency policy). 
19 See infra Part IV (proposing future action for the FCC). 
20 See infra Parts II.A–D (using a chronological approach). 
21 See infra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of the FCC). 
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necessity.22  The FCC is empowered to regulate broadcast indecency, and 
in recent years its policy has garnered much attention.23  Part II.A 
discusses the FCC’s congressional authority and the judicial support of 
this statutory authority, as well as how First Amendment principles 
interact with the FCC’s regulatory scheme.24  Part II.B discusses the 
development of the FCC’s indecency policy.25  Part II.C discusses the 
FCC’s change in its treatment of fleeting indecency.26  Finally, Part II.D 
discusses the Second Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s treatment and 
rejection of the FCC’s fleeting indecency policy.27  Overall, Part II 
provides the necessary foundation for the analysis that the FCC’s policy 
for fleeting indecency is unconstitutional and for the contribution of a 
proposed policy that protects both the public’s interest and the broadcast 
media’s right to free speech.28 
A. The FCC’s Statutory Authority and Powers 
The Radio Act of 1927 (“Radio Act”) was the first major piece of 
broadcasting legislation.29  The airwaves spectrum, according to the 
Radio Act, was as a public resource that no individual could claim as 
property.30  In addition, the Radio Act established the Federal Radio 
                                                 
22 See infra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s mandate that the FCC 
regulate for the public convenience, interest, and necessity). 
23 See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the regulation of 
broadcast indecency as applied); Fallow, supra note 13 (discussing recent applications of the 
FCC’s indecency policy). 
24 See infra Part II.A (discussing legislation and Supreme Court decisions). 
25 See infra Part II.B (using FCC orders and federal court decisions). 
26 See infra Part II.C (discussing recent FCC orders that depart from previous policy). 
27 See infra Part II.D (providing a summary of Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 
F.3d 333 (2d Cir. 2007) rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)). 
28 See infra Parts III, IV (analysis of FCC policy and contribution of new policy). 
29 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).  With the Radio Act of 1927, 
Congress created a government allotment system in which the government retained 
ownership over the broadcast spectrum, but allowed private individuals, firms, or 
corporations to operate channels under a license in order for a private marketplace to exist.  
Id. 
30 Id. § 1 (stating that the government is to maintain control over all channels of radio 
transmissions and is to provide the “use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, 
by individuals, firms, or corporations . . . under licenses granted by Federal authority”).  
“Broadcasting” is defined by statute as “the dissemination of radio communications 
intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations.”  47 
U.S.C. § 153(6) (2006).  See generally Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public 
Interest” Standard:  The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605 (1998).  The Radio Act 
of 1912 was the first piece of legislation that governed radio.  Id. at 608.  It gave the 
government the power to issue licenses by request, but did not allow for the denial of 
licenses because the government had assumed that the spectrum could accommodate all 
frequencies requested.  Id.  However, the unregulated growth of the industry resulted in 
too many frequencies and interference.  Id.  In response, then Secretary of Commerce 
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Commission (“FRC”) to regulate as “public convenience, interest, or 
necessity” required.31  Seven years later, Congress passed the 
Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”), which created 
the FCC.32  The Communications Act maintained much of the language 
of the Radio Act and required that the FCC enforce and execute the 
provisions according to the public convenience, interest, and necessity.33  
                                                                                                             
Herbert Hoover promoted a system of self-regulation, and he first expressed the idea that 
the public owned the airwaves.  Id.  At a 1925 radio conference, Hoover stated, “[t]he ether 
is a public medium, and its use must be for public benefit.”  Id. (quoting Herbert Hoover, 
U.S. Sec’y of Commerce, Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference and 
Recommendations for Regulation of Radio 7 (Nov. 9–11, 1925) (Government Printing Office 
1926)).  The public’s right to the airwaves spectrum became the central idea of the Radio 
Act of 1927.  Id. 
31 Radio Act of 1927, § 4.  See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981).  
The Supreme Court has given deference to the FCC’s interpretation of the public interest.  
Id.  “Our opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission’s judgment regarding 
how the public interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial deference.”  Id.  See 
also infra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
the public convenience, interest, and necessity as factors).  See generally Krasnow & 
Goodman, supra note 30, at 60 (discussing the early application of the public interest 
standard as extending to both technical matters and programming content). 
32 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–613).  The Communications Act of 1934 repealed the Radio 
Act of 1912, abolished the Federal Radio Commission, and gave the FCC power to regulate 
communication services by telegraph, telephone, cable, and radio.  78 CONG. REC. 12,405 
(1934).  See 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (“The [FCC] may perform any and all acts, make such rules 
and regulations, and issue such orders . . . as may be necessary in the execution of its 
functions.”).  The President appoints five members to the FCC, and, along with Congress, 
designates one of the five as chairman.  Id. § 154(a).  See also FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 
309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) (stating that Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934 
under fear that “in the absence of governmental control the public interest might be 
subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field.”).  In order to 
determine the proper procedures to follow, administrative agencies must follow both the 
statute authorizing the agency’s power and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCESS 293 (5th ed. 2009).  The APA provides four types of procedures including formal 
adjudication, informal adjudication, formal rulemaking, and informal rulemaking.  Id. at 
294.  These four methods serve as a starting point, but the authorizing statute “acts as the 
basis for determining which of the procedures described in the APA an agency is required 
to use in taking particular types of actions.”  Id. at 295.  Thus, the FCC is bound by both the 
APA and any procedures specified within 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–613.  See id. (“[T]he APA and 
agency organic acts must be read in pari materia in order to determine the procedures an 
agency must follow in a given case.”). 
33 Communications Act of 1934, § 303.  See also Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 30, at 
626.  The public interest standard could be considered a double-edged sword:  “The 
flexibility inherent in this elusive public interest concept can be enormously significant to 
the FCC not only as a means of modifying policies to meet changed conditions and to 
obtain special support but also as a source of continuing and sometimes hard-to-resolve 
controversy.”  Id.  See generally Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Communications Act of 1934 and Telecommunications Act of 1996—United States 
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In order to create a pro-competitive market that would allow for 
technological advancement, Congress enacted major updates and 
changes through the Telecommunications Act of 1996 but maintained 
that the FCC’s main objectives were the public convenience, interest, and 
necessity.34 
The FCC’s licensing and regulatory powers include policing radio 
wave traffic and the composition of that traffic, such as choosing among 
those who apply for broadcast licenses.35  Such powers may appear to be 
broad, but these powers are limited by what the FCC determines is in the 
public’s best interest, convenience, and necessity.36  According to the 
                                                                                                             
Supreme Court Cases, 32 A.L.R. FED. 2D 125 (2008) (summarizing important Supreme Court 
cases that construe and apply the Communications Act of 1934). 
34 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (maintaining 
“public convenience, interest, or necessity” language).  The Telecommunications Act of 
1996 was originally introduced as the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation 
Act of 1995.  S. 652, 104th Cong. (1995).  The Act was introduced “[t]o provide for a pro-
competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly 
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies 
and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition, 
and for other purposes.”  Id.  See generally Adam Candeub, Media Ownership Regulation, the 
First Amendment, and Democracy’s Future, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1607 (2008) (suggesting 
that media ownership regulation should be aimed at “creating a better agency relationship 
between elected officials and the citizenry” and that political discourse will improve if the 
government regulates media ownership). 
35 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214–16 (1943) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303, which lists 
the powers of the FCC).  See generally JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW:  LIBERTIES, 
RESTRAINTS, AND THE MODERN MEDIA 361 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the FCC’s licensing 
procedures); Leonard M. Baynes, Making the Case for a Compelling Governmental Interest and 
Re-Establishing FCC Affirmative Action Programs for Broadcast Licensing, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 
235 (2004) (arguing that the FCC should employ affirmative action practices when 
assigning licenses); Matthew A. Klopp, Constitutional Malfunction:  Does the FCC’s Authority 
to Revoke a Broadcaster’s License Violate the First Amendment?, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 309, 
327 (2005) (arguing that the FCC’s power to revoke a broadcaster’s license based on content 
is a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment). 
36 See NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (stating that the public interest, convenience, and necessity 
standard is not to be interpreted as so indefinite to provide an unlimited power); Pottsville, 
309 U.S. at 137–38 (stating that consideration of the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity is the touchstone created by Congress).  In 1946, the FCC published “Public 
Service Responsibilities of Broadcast Licensees” to articulate its view of the public interest 
standard.  Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides:  The Failure and 
Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 21 (2004).  
This report: 
[S]pecified that licensees were required to devote an “adequate” 
amount of broadcast time to the coverage of local, national and 
international issues of public concern.  It instructed broadcasters that 
they were expected to air a “reasonable” number of “sustaining” 
programs, meaning programs not sponsored by commercial 
advertising but funded by the broadcaster itself, and local live 
programming.  It warned licensees that they should limit advertising 
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Supreme Court, the public interest standard serves as an instrument for 
discretion and is characteristic of the fluid nature of broadcasting.37  
Because the nature of the broadcasting industry and the public interest 
standard are subject to change, the FCC must act within its statutory 
duty to adjust its regulations.38  The factors’ fluidity, however, is not 
intended to create an indefinite assignment of power, and as such, the 
factors must be interpreted through the scope, character, and quality of 
services at issue, as well as through the First Amendment.39 
The First Amendment mandates that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”40  FCC licensing regulations 
have been challenged on First Amendment grounds, but the Supreme 
Court has held that no free speech right exists in possessing a broadcast 
license.41  In NBC v. United States, the Court found that the FCC did not 
violate the First Amendment by denying broadcast licenses based on 
                                                                                                             
to “a reasonable amount” of overall programming time.  A new FCC 
broadcast license renewal form required applicants to report on their 
program offerings in six categories:  education, entertainment, news, 
religion, discussion and talks. 
Id. (quoting FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946)) 
(internal footnotes omitted). 
37 See Pottsville, 309 U.S. at 138.  In Pottsville, the Pottsville Broadcasting Company 
(“PBC”) appealed the FCC’s denial of PBC’s application for a permit.  Id. at 139.  The FCC 
based the denial on the grounds that PBC was financially disqualified and failed to 
adequately support local interests.  Id. at 139.  Instead of reviewing PBC’s application 
standing alone, the FCC considered it against two other potential broadcasters in order to 
compare and determine which would best serve the public’s interest.  Id. at 140.  The court 
of appeals reversed the FCC and ordered the FCC to consider PBC’s application according 
to the court of appeals’ decision.  Id. at 140.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the administrative law issues.  Id. at 135.  The Court found that because the FCC 
committed legal error and did not give PBC legal rights beyond those possessed by the two 
other applicants, the court of appeals could not create a priority in the administrative 
policy that Congress had not created.  Id. at 145.  The Court said that to force the FCC to 
follow the court of appeals’ order would cause “contingencies of judicial review and of 
litigation,” rather than the public interest, to become decisive factors in determining which 
private entity would receive a license.  Id. at 145–46. 
38 NBC, 319 U.S. at 225 (“If time and changing circumstances reveal that the ‘public 
interest’ is not served by application of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the 
Commission will act in accordance with its statutory obligations.”).  See Krasnow & 
Goodman, supra note 30, at 625 (stating that the public interest standard is useful in 
“keeping up with changing means of communication”). 
39 NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (citing Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage 
Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933)) (“This criterion is not to be interpreted as setting up a 
standard so indefinite as to confer an unlimited power.”).  See generally ZELEZNY, supra note 
35, at 356 (discussing the limited First Amendment protection afforded to the broadcast 
media as compared to the print media). 
40 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
41 See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (discussing NBC, 319 U.S. 190 and Red 
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)). 
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public interest, convenience, or necessity.42  In so holding, the Court 
reasoned that, by its nature, broadcasting is not available to all who wish 
to use the airwaves, and unlike other modes of expression, the use of the 
broadcast airwaves may be permissively denied to some. 43  Moreover, in 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Court reiterated that the scarcity of 
broadcast airwaves permitted the government to regulate access and use, 
and that the people, not the broadcasters, “retain their interest in free 
speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function 
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment.”44  
                                                 
42 319 U.S. at 227.  In NBC, the Court held that the FCC had congressional authority to 
regulate chain broadcasting, and that the regulations as enforced were lawful exercises of 
power.  Id. at 224, 226.  In the case, NBC and CBS networks brought suit to enjoin the 
enforcement of the chain broadcasting regulations promulgated by the FCC.  Id. at 193.  
The facts showed that the FCC undertook a detailed investigation into the practice of chain 
broadcasting and consequently enacted several regulations directed at distinct practices 
deemed detrimental to the public interest.  Id. at 196–97.  The networks attacked the 
regulations as beyond the FCC’s regulatory scope, as arbitrary and capricious, as a result of 
an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power, and as violating free speech rights 
under the First Amendment.  Id. at 209.  See generally The Impact of the FCC’s Chain 
Broadcasting Rules, 60 YALE L.J. 78 (1951) (discussing that the FCC had done little to enforce 
its chain broadcasting rules, and as such, the broadcast industry practices had not changed 
substantially). 
43 NBC, 319 U.S. at 226.  The NBC court stated “[f]reedom of utterance is abridged to 
many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio” because “[u]nlike other modes of 
expression, radio inherently is not available to all.”  Id.  The Court further explained:  “That 
is [radio’s] unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is 
subject to governmental regulation.  Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use 
it must be denied.”  Id.  Thus, because Congress properly delegated licensing power to the 
FCC, there would be no denial of free speech so long as the FCC used the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity standard when granting and rejecting licenses.  Id. at 227.  See 
Varona, supra note 36, at 60 (comparing the scarcity of radio to newspaper).  Varona states 
that “[t]he use of broadcast spectrum is ‘rivalous,’ meaning that its medium is of fixed 
capacity and prone to interference if speakers are not ‘channeled’ and restricted in their 
activities.  Newsprint, by contrast, is nonrivalous.  Anyone wishing to be a newspaper 
publisher may be one.”  Id. 
44 395 U.S. at 390 ( “It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences . . . .”).  Red Lion dealt with the 
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine—which has since been abandoned as a policy.  See 
Jerome A. Baron, What Does the Fairness Doctrine Controversy Really Mean? 12 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 205 (1989).  The case also discussed the equal time provision of the 
Communications Act of 1934.  See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006); ZELEZNY, supra note 35, at 389 
(“Use of time [on a broadcast channel] by a candidate triggers the broadcaster’s obligations 
to provide equal opportunities.”).  The Court explained that once a broadcaster possesses a 
license no constitutional right exists to monopolize the license.  Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.  In 
addition, the First Amendment allows the government to require a licensee to present 
views and voices that are representative of the community, which would otherwise be 
barred from the airwaves.  Id. 
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This scarcity rationale has traditionally served as the primary 
justification for broadcast regulation, including indecency regulation.45 
B. The FCC’s Indecency Regulation Policy 
To ensure that the broadcast airwaves function according to First 
Amendment principles, the FCC is prohibited from censoring broadcast 
communications and from promulgating any regulation that would 
interfere with free speech rights.46  Although the FCC cannot censor 
broadcasts, Congress empowered it to enforce a criminal statute that 
prohibits the broadcast of obscene, indecent, and profane language on 
the public airwaves.47 
                                                 
45 See infra Part II.B (providing a chronological presentation of the FCC’s indecency 
policy changes and case law). 
46 47 U.S.C. § 326.  The statute states in full: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the 
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications 
or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or 
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which 
shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio 
communication. 
Id.  However, as common practice, the FCC may consider the content of past broadcasts 
when considering a licensee’s renewal application.  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 
736 (1978) (citing KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670 (1931)).  In 
addition, 47 U.S.C. § 326 “was not intended to limit the Commission’s power to regulate 
the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane language.”  Id. at 737. 
47 See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 30, 44 Stat. 1162, 1173 (1927) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006)) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than two years, or both.”); Indus. Guidance On the Comm’n’s Case Law 
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & Enforcement Policies Regarding Broads. Indecency (2001 
Industry Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001) (policy statement) (“Congress has given the 
[FCC] the responsibility for administratively enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 1464. . . . [T]he 
Commission may revoke a station license, impose a monetary forfeiture, or issue a warning 
for the broadcast of indecent material.”).  Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1464 as part of the 
Radio Act of 1927, but later moved the provision to the criminal code.  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 
738.  See also 47 C.F.R.§ 73.4165 (2008) (regulation for obscene language); 47 C.F.R. § 73.4170 
(2008) (regulation for indecent language). 
 The Supreme Court, in Cohen v. California, held that obscenity is an unprotected form 
of speech, but that the government may not criminalize distasteful or offensive utterances 
without a particularized and compelling purpose.  403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).  Cohen, the 
appellant, was arrested for wearing the phrase “Fuck the Draft” printed on a jacket into a 
courthouse.  Id. at 16.  The Court stated that the speech at issue did not fall within the 
limited categories of speech that do not enjoy First Amendment protection, such as 
obscenity.  Id. at 19–20.  The Court reasoned that, while such speech may be vulgar or 
offensive to some, this is a necessary side effect of open debate.  Id. at 24–25.  As this note is 
concerned with indecency, there will be no further discussion of obscenity.  See generally 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (articulating the test for obscenity). 
 In Duncan v. United States, the Ninth Circuit upheld a charge of broadcasting profane 
language.  48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931).  The court defined profane language as “[i]rreverent 
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In 1975, the FCC first articulated an indecency policy in response to a 
radio broadcast of George Carlin’s Seven Words You Can Never Say on 
Television.48  The FCC described the standard for indecent material as 
“language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual 
or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a 
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.”49  But when few 
                                                                                                             
toward God or holy things.”  Id. at 133.  Because Duncan’s broadcast included the phrase 
“By God” irreverently and announced an intention to curse others in the name of God, the 
court found that Duncan could be punished under the words of the statute.  Id. at 134.  For 
discussion of the words “obscene, indecent, and profane” in the statute, see generally 
United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussing the meaning of indecent as 
distinguished from obscene); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(discussing definitions of profane and indecent); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th 
Cir. 1966) (discussing the distinctions between obscene, indecent, and profane). 
48 See Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM) (Pacifica 
Complaint), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975) (declaratory order).  This decision arose out of George 
Carlin’s famous Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television monologue, a recording of 
which was broadcast on a New York radio station around 2:00 p.m.  Id. para. 4.  The FCC 
received a complaint from a father who tuned into the broadcast while driving with his 
young son in the car.  Id. para. 3.  The monologue consisted of dirty words that, according 
to Carlin, should not be said on the public airwaves.  Id. para. 5.  The FCC forwarded the 
initial complaint to the radio station for comment.  Id. para. 6.  In its response, the station 
explained that the monologue was aired as part of a weekly program that discussed 
contemporary society’s attitudes about language.  Id. para. 6.  It was the radio station’s 
view that Carlin was a social satirist and his monologue was a natural contribution to the 
discussion.  Id.  In addition, the radio station said that it had warned listeners of the 
potentially offensive language.  Id. 
 The FCC’s order began by listing four reasons why the broadcast medium may be 
regulated more rigorously than other forms of expression, including that: 
(1) children have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised 
by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a place where people’s 
privacy interest is entitled to extra deference; (3) unconsenting adults 
may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is 
being or will be broadcast; and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, 
the use of which the government must therefore license in the public 
interest. 
Id. para. 9 (internal citation omitted).  The FCC singled out the use of radio by children as 
especially compelling.  Id.  The FCC then defined indecent language as that which is 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards.  Id. at para. 11. 
49 Pacifica Complaint, 56 F.C.C.2d para. 11.  The FCC used nuisance law, which channels 
behavior as opposed to actually prohibiting behavior, as a model for its policy.  Id.  In 
applying its new standard to the Carlin monologue, the FCC found that the words used 
“depict[ed] sexual and excretory activities and organs in a manner patently offensive by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium and [were] accordingly 
‘indecent’ when broadcast on radio or television.”  Id. para. 14.  However, the FCC did not 
impose sanctions because it was using the case as an opportunity to clarify its policy 
standards.  Id.  The Commission defended its policy because the number of words that fall 
under the definition was limited and because during late hours such words with some 
value could be broadcast if warning was given.  Id. para. 16.  Moreover, the Commission 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/9
2010] Carlin’s Seven to Bono’s One 715 
children are in the audience, the FCC stated that the standard could 
change and the Commission would also consider the literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value of the alleged indecent speech.50  The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, overturned the policy, which led to 
the seminal Supreme Court case, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.51 
In Pacifica, the Supreme Court considered whether the words at issue 
were indecent under 18 U.S.C.§ 1464 and whether the FCC’s announced 
policy violated the First Amendment.52  The Court found that Carlin’s 
                                                                                                             
felt that a lack of action could lead to “widespread use of indecent language on the public’s 
airwaves, a development which would (1) critically impair broadcasting as an effective 
mode of expression and communication, (2) ignore the rights of unwilling recipients, and 
(3) ignore the danger of exposure to children.”  Id. 
50 Id. para. 12 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating that the indecency 
definition would remain the same, but the FCC would consider literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value).  In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court set out a three-part test for 
obscenity.  413 U.S. at 24.  The third factor in the test for obscenity asks whether a work as a 
whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.  Id.  The Court provided 
the example of medical books that depict human anatomy as depictions that would be 
potentially obscene, but would fail the third factor.  Id. at 26.  See generally Edward John 
Main, The Neglected Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity:  Serious Literary, Artistic, Political, or 
Scientific Value, 11 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1159 (1987) (discussing the interpretation of the third factor 
of the Miller test).  Main describes the third factor as the most important prong of the 
obscenity test, because it is “the diagnostic trait by which a work is classified as protected 
speech” and “identifies the fundamental interest behind the [F]irst [A]mendment 
guarantee of free speech:  the unrestrained communication of ideas.”  Id. at 1176. 
51 Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that despite the FCC’s best 
intentions, the effect of its order was to inhibit the free exchange of expression), rev’d 438 
U.S. 726 (1978).  The D.C. Circuit characterized the FCC’s order as direct censorship in 
violation of 47 U.S.C. § 326.  Id. at 14. 
52 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 734.  In Pacifica, the Court limited its review to whether the FCC’s 
policy was constitutional as applied to the particular broadcast of Carlin’s monologue.  Id. 
at 742.  An “as applied” challenge involves evaluating how the challenged policy or statute 
“operates in practice against the particular litigant and under the facts of the instant case, 
not hypothetical facts in other situations.”  16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187 (2008).  In 
contrast, “a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute requires a showing that no 
set of circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid.”  Id. (citing Ohio v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990)).  The Court denied Pacifica’s allegation 
of overbreadth and stated that indecency must be governed by context.  Id.  In addition, the 
Court stated that while some broadcasters may censor themselves, the FCC’s standard 
would only deter patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and 
activities, which in the Court’s view, lie at the perimeter of First Amendment.  Id. at 743.  
Unconstitutional overbreadth means that a statute or policy prohibits a substantial amount 
of protected speech which limits the free exchange of ideas.  United States v. Williams, 128 
S. Ct. 1830, 1838 (2008).  However, the Supreme Court describes the invalidation of statutes 
or policies on overbreadth grounds as “strong medicine,” especially when such statutes or 
policies proscribe particularly harmful speech.  Id.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
769 (1982) (“Because of the wide-reaching effects of striking down a statute on its face at the 
request of one whose own conduct may be punished despite the First Amendment, we 
have recognized that the overbreadth doctrine is ‘strong medicine’ and have employed it 
with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’”) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
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monologue may have been protected in other contexts, but distinguished 
the broadcast media in two ways: 
First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely 
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.  
Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the 
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but 
also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s 
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder. . . .  
 Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to 
children, even those too young to read.53 
The Court found that the ease of access to broadcasting and the 
government’s strong interest in the well-being of youth justified special 
treatment of indecent broadcasting.54 
After the Pacifica decisions, the FCC followed a narrow policy of 
indecency regulation limited to excessive uses of dirty words such as 
those in Carlin’s monologue.55  However, in 1987, the FCC enunciated a 
                                                                                                             
601, 613 (1973)).  Thus, the Court requires that an overbroad statute or policy must reach a 
“substantial” amount of protected speech, in relation to the statute’s or policy’s overall 
sweep.  Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1838 (2008).  In order to determine whether a statute or policy 
is overbroad, courts must first construe the challenged statute and then determine whether 
the statute covers a substantial amount of protected speech.  Id. at 1838, 1841. 
53 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49 (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)) 
(internal citation omitted).  Thus, the Court undertook a contextual analysis that involved 
distinguishing the broadcast medium from other forms of expression.  Id. at 74748.  The 
Court recognized these two bases of distinction in addition to the traditional basis of 
scarcity.  Id. at 748.  Like the FCC, the Court narrowed its holding based on nuisance 
theory, which requires consideration of relevant variables such as time of day, content of 
program, and differences in medium.  Id. at 750.  See generally Joshua B. Gordon, Note, 
Pacifica is Dead.  Long Live Pacifica:  Formulating a New Argument Structure to Preserve 
Government Regulation of Indecent Broadcasts, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2006) (discussing and 
critiquing Pacifica in more detail). 
54 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.  The Court quoted to Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), 
for the proposition that the “government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’ and in 
supporting ‘parents’ claim to authority in their own household’ justified the regulation of 
otherwise protected expression.”  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.  In Ginsberg, the owner of a 
lunch-counter violated state law by selling obscene magazines to a sixteen-year-old.  390 
U.S. at 631.  The Court found that because the state had an interest in protecting the well-
being of minors, it was within the right of the state to regulate the sale of obscene materials 
to minors.  Id. at 639.  See generally MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN:  
“INDECENCY,” CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH (2001) (discussing the 
assumption that children need to be protected from indecency to protect their 
development). 
55 See Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, para. 10 (1975) 
(memorandum opinion and order) (“We intend strictly to observe the narrowness of the 
Pacifica holding.”); New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to All Broad. & 
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broader policy.56  The Commission stated that broadcasts with repetitive 
uses of sexual or excretory words and phrases were not the only 
broadcasts that could be found indecent; however, if complaints were 
concerned only with the language of a broadcast, then a finding of 
deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive way would be 
necessary to find the broadcast indecent.57  If the indecency alleged went 
beyond language, the context of a particular broadcast would then be 
examined.58  The FCC reiterated that the nuisance rationale underlaid its 
indecency policy and rejected the scarcity rationale as its main 
authorization to regulate indecency.59  In addition, the Commission 
                                                                                                             
Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2726 (1987) (public notice) (stating that the 
Commission had previously limited enforcement efforts to the seven particular words in 
the Carlin monologue). 
56 New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726.  This enforcement policy was 
issued in order to clarify the policies which arose out of three warnings issued earlier the 
same month.  Id.  See generally Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987) 
(memorandum opinion and order); Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987) 
(memorandum opinion and order); Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987) 
(memorandum opinion and order). 
57 New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726; Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 
para. 13.  In addition, the FCC put broadcasters on notice that it would enforce indecency 
on a case by case basis, including broadcasts after 10:00 p.m., because evidence had shown 
that many children were still in the audience after that time.  New Indecency Enforcement 
Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726.  Prior to this policy clarification, the practice had been to 
allow indecent broadcasts after 10:00 p.m. if such broadcasts were preceded by a warning.  
Id.  In each of the three warnings issued during the same month of 1987, the indecent 
broadcasts occurred after 10:00 p.m.  Id.  See Infinity Broad. Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. para. 27 n.47 
(stating that the preference was a case-by-case determination, but that midnight represents 
a time when less children would be in the audience).  In Infinity, the FCC stated that the 
hours between midnight and six in the morning represented the time during which 
broadcasters could air indecent material accompanied by a warning, because the risk that 
children would be in the audience during that time frame was low.  Id. 
58 New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726; Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 
para. 13 (“[S]peech involving the description or depiction of sexual or excretory functions 
must be examined in context to determine whether it is patently offensive under 
contemporary community standards applicable to the broadcast medium.”). 
59 New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726.  See NBC v. United States, 319 
U.S. 190 (1943) (reasoning that the scarcity rationale allowed the FCC to regulate the 
broadcast airwaves).  Some argue that a lack of scarcity in the modern media supports a 
near-complete deregulation of the broadcast airwaves.  See ZELEZNY, supra note 35, at 360 
(discussing whether the scarcity rationale is still valid); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr, The 
Irrelevant Wasteland:  An Exploration of Why Red Lion Doesn't Matter (Much) in 2008, The 
Crucial Importance of the Information Revolution, and the Continuing Relevance of the Public 
Interest Standard in Regulating Access to Spectrum, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 911 (2008) (arguing that 
Red Lion and the scarcity rationale are no longer relevant); Ian J. Antonoff, Comment, You 
Don’t Like It . . . Change the (Expletive Deleted) Channel!:  An Analysis of the Constitutional 
Issues that Plague FCC Enforcement Actions and a Proposal for Deregulation in Favor of Direct 
Consumer Control, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 253, 273 (2005) (“Because of the ever-
increasing availability of broadcast and communication media, the government no longer 
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stated its belief that channeling indecent broadcasts into certain time 
periods represented a valid time, place, and manner restriction on 
speech.60 
In 1988, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals (“D.C. 
Circuit”) upheld the broader policy, but also found that channeling 
indecent broadcasts after midnight was arbitrary and capricious because 
the FCC failed to adequately consider what time constraints should be 
drawn.61  Before the FCC could respond to the court’s order, Congress 
passed legislation that required the FCC to monitor indecent broadcasts 
twenty-four hours a day, which the FCC codified as part of its 
                                                                                                             
needs to be concerned with the reservation of resources as far as communication is 
concerned.”); Matthew C. Holohan, Note, Politics, Technology, & Indecency:  Rethinking 
Broadcast Regulation in the 21st Century, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 341, 366 (2005) (“Because 
technological developments have blurred the distinction between broadcast and non-
broadcast electronic media, differing treatment of these forms of communication is no 
longer legally defensible.”).  See also Quale, supra note 15, at 228.  Quale explains that when 
broadcast television switches to digital transmissions in 2009, the “combination of analog 
frequency reclamation and the augmented broadcasting potential through the use of digital 
frequencies” will make “the limited and scarce nature of the electromagnetic 
spectrum . . . arguably . . . nonexistent.”  Id. 
60 New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726 (citing City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 
(1976)).  The Commission explained that, like an owner of a movie theater, who can limit 
the admission of children to certain films, the broadcast medium must be able to enforce a 
practicable means to separate adults from children in the broadcast audience.  Id. at 2726.  
See generally 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 512 (1998) (discussing time, place, and 
manner restrictions generally).  Time, place, and manner restrictions are valid if the 
regulation is neutral, the incidental burden on speech is no more than necessary, and it 
“promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent 
the regulation.”  Id. 
61 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act I), 852 F.2d 1332, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(vacating the Infinity and University of California decisions).  The court also rejected claims 
that the definition was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  Id. at 1339–40.  The 
appellants argued that the generic indecency definition, as distinguished from the “seven 
dirty words” definition, was impermissibly and inherently vague.  Id. at 1337–38.  The void 
for vagueness doctrine stems from due process, not First Amendment, jurisprudence.  
United States v. Williams,  128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008).  A statute or policy is 
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to put a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that his 
or her conduct violates the law, or if a lack of standards encourages discriminatory 
enforcement.  Id. (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)).  In ACT I, the court 
discussed the Supreme Court’s finding of indecency in Pacifica, which it understood as 
implicitly rejecting that the FCC’s policy was impermissibly vague.  ACT I, 852 F.2d. at 
1339.  Appellants also argued that the definition was overbroad because it lacked an 
exception for material with merit.  Id.  In rejecting the argument, the court reiterated that 
the government’s strong interest in protecting children could outweigh any merit of a 
particular broadcast.  Id. at 1340.  According to the court, the “overall value of a work will 
not necessarily alter the impact of certain words or phrases on children.”  Id.  Thus, the 
overall value of material does not prevent a finding of indecency.  Id.  See supra note 52 
(discussing constitutional overbreadth). 
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administrative code.62  In 1991, the D.C. Circuit struck down the total ban 
as unconstitutional.63  A year later in 1992, Congress mandated that the 
FCC adopt regulations that would create a safe harbor between the 
hours of midnight and six in the morning, during which broadcasters 
could air indecent broadcasts.64  Once again, the D.C. Circuit ruled on the 
constitutionality of the regulations.65 
In Action for Children’s Television (“ACT III”), the court found that the 
FCC had demonstrated that the creation of a safe harbor period 
                                                 
62 Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2186, 2228 (1988) (requiring the FCC to enforce 18 
U.S.C. § 1464 twenty-four hours a day); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1990).  The regulation stated in 
full:  “The Commission will enforce the provisions of section 1464 of the United States 
Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. 1464, on a twenty-four hour per day basis in accordance with 
Pub. L. No. 100-459.”  Id.  See generally Michael J. Cohen, Note, Have You No Sense of 
Decency?  An Examination of the Effect of Traditional Values and Family-Oriented Organizations 
on Twenty-First Century Broadcast Indecency Standards, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 113, 118 
(2005) (discussing the development of safe harbor periods in more detail). 
63 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT II), 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(stating that Congress’s mandate was unconstitutional because the congressional debates 
preceded the 1988 decision and nothing in the intervening months had changed the 1988 
decision’s precedential value).  The ACT II court ordered the FCC to: 
[R]edetermin[e] . . . the times at which indecent material may be 
broadcast, to carefully review and address the specific concerns [the 
court] raised in ACT I:  among them, the appropriate definitions of 
children and reasonable risk for channeling purposes, the paucity of 
station- or program-specific audience data expressed as a percentage 
of the relevant age group population, and the scope of the 
government’s interest in regulating indecent broadcasts. 
Id. at 1510 (citing ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1341–44) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
64 See Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949, 954 (1992); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1993).  
The regulation stated in full: 
(a) No licensee of a radio or television broadcast station shall broadcast 
any material which is obscene.  (b) No licensee of a public broadcast 
station, as defined in 47 U.S.C. 397(6), that goes off the air at or before 
12 midnight shall broadcast on any day between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. 
any material which is indecent.  (c) No licensee of a radio or television 
broadcast station not described in paragraph (b) of this section shall 
broadcast on any day between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight any material 
which is indecent. 
47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1993). 
65 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT III), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  
Appellants challenged the regulations for the following reasons: 
First, the statute and regulations violate the First Amendment because 
they impose restrictions on indecent broadcasts that are not narrowly 
tailored to further the Government’s interest . . . second, [the 
regulation] unconstitutionally discriminates among categories of 
broadcasters by distinguishing the times during which certain public 
and commercial broadcasters may air indecent material; and third, the 
Commission’s generic definition of indecency is unconstitutionally 
vague. 
Id. at 659. 
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furthered a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored 
to further that interest.66  The court stated that the regulation reduced 
children’s exposure to indecent broadcasts and did not overly interfere 
with adults’ ability to watch and listen to such material.67  As a result, the 
court upheld a safe harbor period between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.68 
In 2001, the FCC issued comprehensive industry guidance that 
described its methods for regulating indecent broadcasts.69  The 
guidance stated that to support a finding of indecency, first, “the 
material . . . must fall within the subject matter scope of [the] indecency 
definition—that is, the material must describe or depict sexual or 
excretory organs or activities,” and second, “the broadcast must be 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for 
the broadcast medium.”70  When making indecency determinations, the 
                                                 
66 Id. at 661, 667 (“[W]e believe the Government’s own interest in the well-being of 
minors provides an independent justification for the regulation of broadcast indecency.”).  
The court had examined empirical evidence that suggested fifty-five percent of respondent 
children watched television without parental supervision.  Id. at 661.  In addition, the court 
differentiated broadcasts from cable subscriptions, stating that:  “[B]roadcast audiences 
have no choice but to ‘subscribe’ to the entire output of traditional broadcasters.  Thus they 
are confronted without warning with offensive material.”  Id. at 660. 
67 Id. at 667 (“Although the restrictions burden the rights of many adults, it seems 
entirely appropriate that the marginal convenience of some adults be made to yield to the 
imperative needs of the young.”). 
68 Id. at 669.  See generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2007) (current form of the regulation).  The 
regulation had also included a public broadcaster exemption which allowed some 
broadcasters to begin airing indecent material at ten p.m.  47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1993).  
Because the court found that neither Congress nor the Commission had adequately 
explained the exception, it concluded that the midnight to six a.m. safe harbor was invalid.  
ACT III, 58 F.3d at 669.  The mere fact that Congress included a lesser time period negated 
its argument that starting at midnight was the least restrictive means.  Id. at 668.  Although 
the court found that, standing alone, the midnight to six a.m. safe harbor was 
constitutional, it could not ignore the ill-explained exception, and thus, struck the more 
restrictive time period.  Id. at 669. 
69 Indus. Guidance on the Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & 
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broads. Indecency (2001 Industry Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R. 
7999 (2001) (policy statement) .  The FCC discussed the judicial and legislative decisions 
that have shaped the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, noting that the First Amendment 
limits how the FCC can regulate indecent content.  Id. paras. 3–6, at 8000–01. 
70 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. paras. 7– 8, at 8002 (citing WPBN/WTOM License 
Subsidiary, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 1838, 1840–41 (2000)).  This two-prong analysis consisted of an 
objective indecency definition and a subjective patently offensive test.  Id.  The FCC stated 
that the under the patently offensive prong, “community standard” is not a local 
determination, but that the standard is “that of an average broadcast viewer or listener and 
not the sensibilities of any individual complainant.”  Id. para. 8, at 8002 (quoting 
WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, 15 F.C.C.R. at 1841).  The language “contemporary 
community standards” is taken from the test for obscenity articulated in Miller v. California.  
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).  In Miller, the Supreme Court rejected the notion of a national 
standard and stated that an attempt to find a national standard would be an “exercise in 
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FCC said it would consider the full context of challenged broadcasts.71  
The Commission highlighted the principle contextual factors as: 
                                                                                                             
futility.”  Id. at 30.  Moreover, the Court stated, “[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally 
sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi 
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”  Id. at 
32.  While the Court was silent in Pacifica about the contemporary community standard 
applied to broadcast media, the Court has extended the Miller reasoning to non-broadcast 
media.  See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002) (“[In the Internet context, i]f a 
publisher chooses to send its material into a particular community . . . it is the publisher’s 
responsibility to abide by that community’s standards.”); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. 
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124–25 (1989) (finding that for “dial-a-porn” services, just because 
“distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subject[] to varying community 
standards”  a federal statute will not be “unconstitutional because of the failure of 
application of uniform national standards of obscenity”); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 
726, 744–745 (1973).  See generally Michael Kaneb, Note, Neither Realistic nor Constitutionally 
Sound:  The Problem of the FCC’s Community Standard for Broadcast Indecency Determinations, 
49 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1084–85 (2008) (comparing the FCC’s indecency policy to obscenity 
statutes for the internet, cable, and telephone).  Kaneb argues that the FCC’s use of a 
national community standard is inconsistent with First Amendment jurisprudence and its 
regulatory responsibilities, and thus that the Supreme Court should require the FCC to 
apply local community standards.  Id. at 1085. 
71 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 9, at 8002.  The FCC stated that such context-
dependent determinations are highly fact-specific and that various factors have been 
considered in past cases.  Id. para. 9, at 8003.  To illustrate, the Commission included a 
sample of cases in which indecency complaints were granted and rejected.  Id. paras. 13–23, 
at 8004–15.  The examples included radio and television cases.  Id.  The FCC included the 
following radio broadcast as an example of an indecent broadcast due to the “inescapable” 
sexual content: 
 I whipped out my Whopper and whispered, Hey, Sweettart, 
how’d you like to Crunch on my Big Hunk for a Million Dollar Bar?  
Well, she immediately went down on my Tootsie Roll and you know, 
it was like pure Almond Joy.  I couldn’t help but grab her delicious 
Mounds, . . . this little Twix had the Red Hots. . . . [A]s my Butterfinger 
went up her tight little Kit Kat, and she started to scream Oh, Henry!  
Oh, Henry! . . . Well, I was giving it to her Good’n Plenty, and all of a 
sudden, my Starburst . . . . [S]he started to grow a bit Chunky 
and . . . [s]ure enough, nine months later, out popped a Baby Ruth. 
Id. para. 14, at 8006.  Compare that broadcast to the following which was not found to be 
indecent: 
 As you know, you gotta stop the King, but you can’t kill 
him . . . So you talk to Dick Nixon, man you get him on the phone and 
Dick suggests maybe getting like a mega-Dick to help out, but you 
know, you remember the time the King ate mega-Dick under the table 
at a 095 picnic . . . you think about getting mega-Hodgie, but that’s no 
good because you know, the King was a karate dude . . .  
 Power!  Power!  Power!  Thrust!  Thrust!  Thrust!  First it was Big 
Foot, the monster car crunching 4x4 pickup truck.  Well, move over, 
Big Foot!  Here comes the most massive power-packed monster ever!  
It’s Big Peter!  (Laughter)  Big Peter . . . . Formerly the Big Dick’s Dog 
Wiener Mobile. . . . So look out Big Foot!  Big Peter is coming!  Oh my 
God!  It’s coming!  Big Peter!  (Laughter). 
Rom: From Carlin's Seven to Bono's One:  The Federal Communications Co
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
722 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or 
depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) 
whether the material dwells on or repeats at length 
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; 
(3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to 
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been 
presented for its shock value.72 
In its discussion of the second factor, the FCC stated that the repetition of 
sexual or excretory materials exacerbates a broadcast’s offensiveness and 
that fleeting references usually do not support a finding of indecency.73  
After issuing this guidance, the FCC began to crack down on indecency 
and further broadened the scope of materials considered indecent.74 
C. Development of Fleeting Indecency Regulation 
In a 2004 attempt to further regulate indecency, the FCC changed its 
policy regarding potentially indecent fleeting materials in Golden Globe 
Awards.75  The first change concerned applying the first step of the 
                                                                                                             
Id. para. 15, at 8007. 
72 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 10, at 8003.  The FCC stated that no single 
factor is determinative, but that the factors are balanced in order to ultimately determine 
what is indecent.  Id.  The illustrative examples provided by the FCC were divided based 
on these three factors.  Id. at 8003, 8008, 8010.  In the first set of examples, the Commission 
stated that under the first factor, the likelihood of indecency increased as the explicitness 
and graphic nature of the broadcasts increased.  Id. para. 12, at 8003.  In the second set of 
examples, a lack of repetition had often weighed against a finding of indecency under the 
second factor.  Id. para. 17, at 8008.  Finally, in the third set of examples, the third factor 
depended upon the apparent purpose for which the material was presented.  Id. para. 20, at 
8010. 
73 Id. para. 17, at 8008.  The FCC stated: 
Repetition of and persistent focus on sexual or excretory material have 
been cited consistently as factors that exacerbate the potential 
offensiveness of broadcasts.  In contrast, where sexual or excretory 
references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in 
nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding of 
indecency. 
Id. 
74 See infra Part II.C (discussing new fleeting indecency policy). 
75 See Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
“Golden Globe Awards” Program (Golden Globe Awards), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, para. 8, at 4978 
(2004) (memorandum opinion and order).  In 2004, the FCC acted in response to numerous 
complaints about the Golden Globes awards show, during which the singer Bono uttered 
the word “fucking” on live network television.  Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 3, at 
4975–76.  An FCC panel originally did not find the utterance indecent, but a full panel 
reversed.  Id. paras. 1–2, at 4975.  See also Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. 
Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8, 2005 (2006 Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, para. 74, at 2684 (2006) 
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indecency test, which is whether the material described sexual or 
excretory activities.76  The FCC stated that in its view, “given the core 
meaning of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or a variation, in any 
context, inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls within 
the first prong of our indecency definition.”77  Thus, the Commission 
found that any use of “fuck” would meet the requirements of the first 
step of the indecency analysis per se.78  Likewise, the FCC found that 
variations of the word “shit” have an inherently excretory connotation, 
and presumptively meet the requirements of the first step of the 
indecency analysis.79 
Second, in determining whether the material dwelled on or repeated 
the sexual or excretory organs or activities under the second step of the 
indecency test, the FCC stopped placing disproportionate weight on 
whether material was repeated or fleeting.80  Instead, the FCC 
                                                                                                             
(notices of apparent liability and memorandum opinion and order) (changing application 
of the indecency test’s first step for uses of “shit”). 
76 Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 8, at 4978.  In 2001, the FCC articulated that, in 
order for material to be found indecent, “the material must describe or depict sexual or 
excretory organs or activities,” and “the broadcast must be patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.”  2001 Industry Guidance, 
16 F.C.C.R. paras.  7–8, at 8002 (citing WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 
1838, 1840–41 (2000)). 
77 Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 8, at 4978 (finding this conclusion consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s determination in Pacifica that “fuck” depicts sexual activities).  
The FCC then asked whether the use of “fuck” was patently offensive under contemporary 
community standards.  Id. para. 9, at 4979.  Because no political, artistic, or any other 
independent reason was offered for the word’s use, the FCC found that its use was 
shocking and gratuitous.  Id.  In the Commission’s view, a failure to take action against 
such shocking and gratuitous language “when children were expected to be in the 
audience . . . would likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive language.”  Id. 
78 See id. para. 8, at 4978.  The per se rule includes non-literal uses of “fuck”, such as 
Bono’s use of “fucking” as an adjective.  See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 
444, 459 (2007) (discussing literal and non-literal uses of the f-word); Complaints Regarding 
Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, para. 23, 
at 13308 (2006) (order) (upholding prior 2006 Order and stating that “any strict dichotomy 
between ‘expletives’ and ‘descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory functions’ is 
artificial and does not make sense in light of the fact than an ‘expletive’s’ power to offend 
derives from its sexual or excretory meaning”). 
79 2006 Order, 21 F.C.C.R. paras. 74–78, at 2684–85.  The FCC found “shit” had an 
inherently excretory meaning.  Id. para. 74, at 2684.  In addition, the Commission explained 
that some words, such as “shit” and “fuck,” are so grossly offensive that they are 
presumptively profane.  Id. para. 19, at 2669.  However, the FCC also stated that this 
presumption can be overcome if it is demonstrated that the language was essential for 
education or artistic purposes, or of a matter of public importance.  Id. 
80 Compare Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 9, at 4979 (memorandum opinion and 
order) (“Neither Congress nor the courts have ever indicated that broadcasters should be 
given free rein to air any vulgar language, including isolated and gratuitous instances of 
vulgar language.”), with 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 17, at 8008 (“[W]here 
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emphasized its contextual analysis, which would equally apply the three 
principle factors explained in 2001 Industry Guidance and take “into 
account the manner and purpose of broadcast material.”81 
Finally, the FCC explicitly abandoned past precedent that indicated 
isolated or fleeting broadcasts would not be found indecent.82  The 
Commission put broadcasters on future notice that a lack of repetition 
does not mandate that “otherwise patently offensive” material is not 
indecent.83  The FCC justified its new approach to indecency because, in 
                                                                                                             
sexual or excretory references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in 
nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding of indecency.”). 
81 2006 Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at para. 15, 2668.  For example, the FCC explained that: 
[M]aterial that panders to, titillates, or shocks the audience is treated 
quite differently than material that is primarily used to educate or 
inform the audience.  In particular, we recognize the need for caution 
with respect to complaints implicating the editorial judgment of 
broadcast licensees in presenting news and public affairs 
programming, as these matters are at the core of the First 
Amendment’s free press guarantee. 
Id.  This contextual approach was applied in Young Broadcasting of San Francisco, Inc., 19 
F.C.C.R. 1751 (2004) (notice of apparent liability for forfeiture). 
In Young, the alleged indecency took place when a morning news show hosted performers 
from the “Puppetry of the Penis” stage show.  Id. para. 3, at 1752.  The two performers wore 
capes, but were nude underneath.  Id.  During the course of the interview, the performers 
offered to demonstrate the “puppetry,” and the news hosts agreed.  Id.  Although the 
performers demonstrated their talents off-screen, the penis of one performer was fully, but 
briefly, exposed on-camera.  Id.  Young Broadcasting challenged the allegation of 
indecency, in part, due to the fleeting duration of the depiction.  Id. para. 11, at 1755.  The 
FCC compared the full frontal nudity in Young to full frontal nudity in the film Schindler’s 
List, which was found to be incidental to the broadcast and was not pandering, titillating, 
or shocking in context.  Id. para. 14, at 1756.  See WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 
F.C.C.R. 1838, para. 13, at 1842 (2000) (“[B]roadcast of Schindler’s List [was] not patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast 
medium . . . . Based on the full context of its presentation . . . including the subject matter of 
the film, the manner of its presentation, and the warnings that accompanied the broadcast 
of [the] film . . . .”).  However, the FCC found the newscast depiction to be graphic, explicit, 
and, under the third factor, intended to titillate, pander to, and shock viewers.  Young, 19 
F.C.C.R. para. 14, at 1757. 
82 Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 12, at 4980.  The FCC quoted the Pacifica policy 
that required a deliberate and repetitive use of expletives in a patently offensive manner in 
order to be found indecent.  Id.  The FCC then departed from that portion of the policy and 
“any similar cases holding that isolated or fleeting use of the ‘F-Word’ or a variant thereof 
in situations such as this is not indecent and conclude that such cases are not good law to 
that extent.”  Id.  Additionally, the FCC stated that this change in policy was not 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pacifica because the Court left open the 
issue of whether occasional expletives were indecent.  Id. para. 16, at 4982.  The 
Commission justified the change on the same basis as Pacifica:  the well being of children 
and the ease with which children access the broadcast medium.  Id. 
83 Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 17, at 4982 (“By our action today, broadcasters 
are on clear notice that, in the future, they will be subject to potential enforcement action 
for any broadcast of the ‘F-Word’ or a variation thereof in situations such as that here.”).  
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its view, a lack of action would lead to more widespread use of offensive 
language when children would be in the audience.84  In 2007, the new 
policy’s justifications and application were challenged in court.85 
D. Fleeting Indecency Policy Tested:  Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 
489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) 
In Fox v. FCC, the Second Circuit reviewed the FCC’s policy outlined 
in Golden Globe Awards and 2006 Order, and rejected the FCC’s policy to 
sanction fleeting materials because the policy was arbitrary and 
capricious.86  In order to determine if the FCC’s policy changes were 
                                                                                                             
The FCC found the Golden Globes broadcast indecent, but did not issue a penalty because 
previous policy would have permitted the broadcast, and there was not requisite notice to 
support a monetary penalty.  Id. para. 15, at 4981–82. 
84 Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 9, at 4979. 
85 See infra Part III.C (discussing the Second Circuit and Supreme Court case addressing 
the FCC’s fleeting indecency policy). 
86 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1800 
(2009).  See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court’s reversal 
of the Second Circuit).  The case was before the court as a petition for review after the FCC 
had issued notices of liability to Fox and CBS for broadcasts that included uses of “shit” 
and “fuck.”  Id. at 453.  See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); 47 
U.S.C. § 402 (2006) (describing the administrative policies for judicial review of an agency 
decision).  The court explained that: 
Agency action is arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has relied on 
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed 
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation 
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or 
is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or 
the product of agency expertise.” 
Fox, 489 F.3d at 455 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).  Agencies are free to change policies, but an agency must 
know that it has changed course, provide valid reasons for the change, and show that such 
changes are within the agency’s authority.  Id. at 456 (quoting N.Y. Council, Ass’n of 
Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 1985)).  This 
includes requiring that the agency explain why the reasoning behind the prior policy is no 
longer dispositive:  “a flip-flop must be accompanied by a reasoned explanation of why the 
new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the old rule.”  Id. at 457 (quoting N.Y. 
Council, 757 F.2d at 508).  See generally PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 32, at 388 
(describing the arbitrary and capricious test). 
 Accord CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 175 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding the FCC’s fleeting 
indecency policy to be arbitrary and capricious when used to assess a $550,000 forfeiture 
penalty), cert. granted and vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009) (remanding in light of Fox v. FCC).  
CBS v. FCC was before the Third Circuit as a petition for review, because CBS appealed the 
monetary forfeiture imposed upon it by the FCC under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) for broadcasting 
indecent material in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999.  Id. at 171.  The 
material deemed indecent was broadcast as part of the Super Bowl XXXVIII halftime show 
in February 2004 featuring musical performers Justin Timberlake and Janet Jackson.  Id.  
The musical act consisted of Timberlake’s popular song “Rock Your Body,” sexually 
suggestive choreography, and the lyrics “gonna have you naked by the end of this song.”  
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done for valid reasons, the court addressed each of the rationales put 
forth by the FCC to justify those changes.87  The FCC first reasoned that 
its policy protected children from suffering the first blow of isolated or 
fleeting expletives, but the court rejected this rationalization because the 
theory bore no rational relation to the FCC’s actual indecency policy.88  
The court stated that viewers, including children, would still be forced to 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 171–72.  While Timberlake sang the excerpted lyric he tore away a part of Jackson’s 
bustier which exposed her breast for nine-sixteenths of one second.  Id. at 172.  CBS had a 
five-second delay in place for verbal indecency, but no such technology for video images 
was implemented.  Id.  Approximately ninety million viewers watched the halftime show, 
and the FCC received a large number of complaints about the incident.  Id. at 171.  
Following an investigation into the incident, with which CBS complied, the FCC 
subsequently issued a $550,000 forfeiture order.  Id. at 171–72. 
 In its review of the order, the court agreed with the Second Circuit in Fox that the FCC 
had changed its indecency policy with regard to fleeting materials.  Id. at 178.  However, 
the FCC argued that CBS should have known that fleeting or isolated material was 
actionable due to the FCC’s decision in Industry Guidance On the Commission’s Case Law 
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & Enforcement Policies Regarding Broads. Indecency (2001 
Industry Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001).  Id.; see supra notes 71–72 and accompanying 
text (describing the contextual approach).  The court rejected this argument, because the 
FCC’s enforcement precedent did not support this assertion.  CBS, 535 F.3d at 180.  The 
FCC further argued that Golden Globe Awards applied only to fleeting expletives, not 
fleeting images, such as nudity.  Id. at 181; see supra notes 75–84 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Golden Globe Awards order).  Thus, according the FCC, it applied its 2001 
indecency approach and the forfeiture order was not a retroactive application of Golden 
Globe Awards.  CBS, 535 F.3d at 181.  The court also rejected this argument, because the FCC 
had never differentiated between images and utterances in any prior decisions or orders.  
Id.  The court stated that the proper inquiry was whether: 
[T]he FCC’s characterization of its policy history is accurate.  If it is not, 
then the FCC’s policy change must be set aside as arbitrary and 
capricious, because it has failed to even acknowledge its departure 
from its former policy let alone supply a ‘reasoned explanation’ for the 
change as required by State Farm. 
Id. at 183.  See generally State Farm, 463 U.S. at 39–57 (describing standard for determining 
whether agencies have properly adapted its rules to changing circumstances).  Because the 
evidence showed that the FCC had never treated images or utterances differently, and 
because the FCC refused to acknowledge a change in policy, the court held that the policy 
“of including fleeting images within the scope of actionable indecency is arbitrary and 
capricious . . . and therefore [is] invalid as applied to CBS.”  CBS, 535 F.3d at 189.  On 
alternative grounds, the court also found that the FCC misapplied the concept of 
respondeat superior to CBS, but this topic is outside the scope of this note.  See id. 
87 Fox, 489 F.3d at 457 (noting that the court may only consider reasons put forth by the 
agency itself). 
88 Id. at 458.  The court also stated that the FCC had failed to adequately explain why its 
policy for the previous thirty years allowed fleeting expletives to be an acceptable first 
blow.  Id.  The reasoning did not fit the actual policy, in the court’s view, because the FCC 
stated at oral argument that not every occurrence of a fleeting expletive would be indecent 
or profane under its rules.  Id.  For example, the FCC stated that an expletive occurring 
during a bona fide news interview or instances when expletives were integral to a work 
would be excused.  Id. 
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accept the first blow of expletives that would occur during excused 
programs, and thus the FCC’s policy did not support its assertion of 
concern for the viewing public.89  The court also rejected the FCC’s 
arguments that an exemption for fleeting expletives would cause a 
barrage of expletives at all hours of the day and that the categorical 
requirement of repetition would be at odds with the FCC’s contextual 
approach to indecency.90  Thus, the court found that the FCC had not 
provided a reasoned analysis to justify a departure from previous policy 
and that the new policy was invalid under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.91 
                                                 
89 Id. at 459.  See generally Justin Winquist, Comment, Arbitrary and F^@#$*! Capricious:  
An Analysis of the Second Circuit’s Rejection of the FCC’s Fleeting Expletive Regulation in Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (2007), 57 AM. U.L. REV. 723 (2008) (discussing the Second 
Circuit’s discussion of the first blow theory and how the court’s analysis precludes any 
content-based approach to indecency).  The “first blow” rationale was first described by the 
Supreme Court in Pacifica.  See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) (“To say that one 
may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like 
saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.”). 
90 Fox, 489 F.3d at 460.  The court determined that these arguments were “devoid of any 
evidence that suggest[ed] a fleeting expletive [was] harmful,” and did not establish “that 
this harm [was] serious enough to warrant government regulation.”  Id. at 461.  In its 
rejection of these two arguments, the court noted that the FCC’s new policy also included a 
categorical approach—that all uses of “fuck” or “shit” fail under the first prong of the 
indecency test—which seemed to conflict with the contextual approach the FCC followed.  
Id. at 460.  The court also said the FCC failed to provide an adequate explanation as to why 
fleeting expletives suddenly would qualify under the unchanged indecency test.  Id.  See 
generally Jane D. Brown et. al., Sexy Media Matter:  Exposure to Sexual Content in Music, 
Movies, Television, and Magazines Predicts Black and White Adolescents’ Sexual Behavior, 117 
PEDIATRICS 1087 (2005); Anita Chandra et. al., Does Watching Sex on Television Predict Teen 
Pregnancy?  Findings From a National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 122 PEDIATRICS 1047, 1052 
(2008) (“[F]requent exposure to sexual content on television predicts early pregnancy.”).  
While these two studies address the harm arising out of sexual content, studies in the 
future could show similar harm arising from youth exposure to expletives on broadcast 
television.  See Brown, supra; Chandra, supra. 
91 Fox, 489 F.3d at, 462.  The court remanded back to the FCC for further proceedings 
consistent with the opinion, but the Supreme Court granted the FCC’s writ of certiorari.  
See id. at 467; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.(Fox II), 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).  See also Fox, 
489 F.3d at 469 (Leval, J. dissenting).  In dissent, Judge Leval found that the FCC had 
offered a reasoned and sensible, “although not necessarily compelling,” explanation for its 
change in policy.  Id.  Departing from the majority, Judge Leval determined that the reasons 
proffered by the FCC were sufficient to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
requirements because “[i]t made clear acknowledgment that its Golden Globe [Awards] and 
[2006] Order rulings were not consistent with its prior standard regarding lack of repetition.  
It announced the adoption of a new standard.  And it furnished a reasoned explanation for 
the change.”  Id. at 470.  Judge Leval faulted the majority for failing to give proper 
deference to the FCC by substituting its own judgment for that of the agency and for 
setting aside the FCC’s judgment based on disagreement.  Id. at 472.  Thus, because the 
majority failed to give the FCC deference in matters within the agency’s competence, Judge 
Leval dissented.  Id. at 473.  See generally 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (arbitrary and 
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Even though the court disposed of the case under administrative law 
theories, it still chose to address the constitutional issues that were fully 
briefed and argued before the court because the court was skeptical that 
the FCC would be able to put forth a reasoned analysis that would pass 
constitutional muster.92  First, the court agreed with Fox and the other 
networks that the FCC’s indecency test did not provide proper clarity 
and unduly chilled free speech.93  Second, the court compared the FCC’s 
indecency test with the identical test applied in the internet context that 
was struck down in Reno v. ACLU as unconstitutionally vague.94  Third, 
                                                                                                             
capricious standard); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (“The scope of review under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (stating that administrative 
decisions should not be set aside “simply because the court is unhappy with the result 
reached”). 
92 Fox, 489 F.3d at 462 (noting that indecent speech is fully protected by the First 
Amendment, including that which falls under the FCC’s policies).  See generally Sable 
Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (noting that indecent, but not obscene, 
speech is protected under the First Amendment).  The court introduced this portion of the 
opinion in a footnote, stating that “[w]e recognize that what follows is dicta, but we note 
that ‘dicta often serve extremely valuable purposes.’”  Fox, 489 F.3d at 462 n.12 (quoting 
Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution:  Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 
1252 (2006)).  Furthermore, the court stated that it was following the fundamental principle 
of judicial restraint on constitutional questions.  Id. at 462. 
93 Fox, 489 F.3d at 463 (noting also that the test required broadcasters to “‘steer far wider 
of the unlawful zone’”) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).  See John 
Eggerton, Chernin:  FCC Needs to Stop Regulating Speech, BROAD. & CABLE, Oct. 21, 2008, 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6607430.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).  
In this article, News Corp. President and COO Peter Chernin is quoted as describing the 
FCC’s per se indecency policy as “an absolute threat to the First Amendment.”  Id. 
94 Fox, 489 F.3d at 463 (“Because of the ‘vague contours’ of the regulation, the Court held 
that ‘it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to 
constitutional protection.’”) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)).  See Reno, 521 
U.S. 844.  The networks argued that the FCC’s indecency test was “undefined, 
indiscernible, inconsistent, and consequently, unconstitutionally vague.”  Fox, 489 F.3d at 
463.  However, in FCC v. Pacifica, the Supreme Court discussed the definition of indecency, 
and did not suggest that the FCC’s construction of the term was unconstitutionally vague.  
438 U.S. 726, 739–41 (1978) (discussing the definition of indecency and accepting the FCC’s 
conclusion that Carlin’s monologue was indecent under the FCC’s interpretation of the 
term).  Moreover, in Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT I), the D.C. Circuit stated 
that the Pacifica holding has been understood as implicitly rejecting that the FCC’s policy 
was impermissibly vague.  852 F.2d 1332, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  The court noted that in 
Pacifica, the Supreme Court did not address whether the indecency definition used by the 
FCC was unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 1338 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741).  Moreover, 
the court noted that the Supreme Court quoted the definition with some approval.  Id. at 
1339.  Given the tradition of the FCC’s indecency policy dating back to Pacifica and the 
Supreme Court’s tendency to distinguish broadcasting from all other types of media or 
technology, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would invalidate the FCC’s policy as void 
for vagueness.  See generally United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) 
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the court questioned whether the FCC was given arbitrary discretion to 
sanction speech based on the speech’s merit, which the Supreme Court 
has held unconstitutional in the licensing context.95  Finally, the court 
questioned the appropriate level of scrutiny in response to Fox’s 
arguments that the broadcast media should no longer enjoy the special 
status that allows the media to avoid exacting scrutiny.96  However, the 
                                                                                                             
(noting that the key difference between cable and broadcasting is that the option to block 
programming is absent from broadcasting); Reno, 521 U.S. at 867 (“[A]s a matter of history 
[the broadcast media have] ‘received the most limited First Amendment protection,’ [and 
the internet has no comparable history.]”) (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748); Sable, 492 U.S. 
at 127–28 (stating that telephone services are different than broadcasting because it requires 
users to take an affirmative step, unlike broadcasting which is pervasive). 
95 Fox, 489 F.3d at 464.  To succeed on this argument, the networks need only show that 
the FCC policy prevents the FCC from exercising its discretion in a content-based manner.  
Id.  The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that speech regulations cannot be based on the 
subjective discretion of government officials, because such discretion could become a 
means for suppressing viewpoints.  Id. (citing Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 
750, 758 (1988)).  In the licensing context the Supreme Court has held that in situations 
where “the government requires a license or permit in order for speech to occur,” three 
requirements must be met:  (1) “the government [must have] an important reason for 
licensing”; (2) “there [must be] clear criteria leaving almost no discretion to the licensing 
authority”; and (3) “there must be procedural safeguards.”  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 964–65 (3d ed. 2006).  These criteria are 
applied when licensing is used as a prior restraint.  Id. at 964.  See generally Alexander v. 
United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (“‘[P]rior restraint[s]’ [are] . . . administrative and 
judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that 
such communications are to occur.’”) (quoting MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH § 4.03 (1984)). 
96 Fox, 489 F.3d at 465.  Exacting or strict scrutiny generally is applied in First 
Amendment contexts.  Id. at 464.  However, because the broadcast media is unique for the 
reasoning set forth in Pacifica, restrictions on broadcast speech are upheld if the restriction 
is “‘narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest.’”  Id. at 464–65 
(quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984)).  Fox and the networks 
argued that the basis for the broadcast media’s unique treatment had been eviscerated, due 
in part to the prevalence of cable and satellite television.  Id. at 465.  The court recognized 
that in the future, the increasingly difficult task of describing broadcast media as uniquely 
invasive could lead to the application of strict scrutiny in this area.  Id.  Further, the 
networks relied on Playboy, which applied strict scrutiny to the cable television industry.  
Id.  See 529 U.S. 803.  Playboy involved a statute which required cable operators who 
provided sexually explicit channels to either fully scramble the content or limit the 
transmission of such material into the safe harbor period between ten p.m. and six a.m.  529 
U.S. at 806.  The statute was invalidated because a less restrictive means was available.  Id. 
at 815.  In Fox, Fox argued that the V-chip technology provided a similarly less restrictive 
alternative for the broadcast media.  Fox, 489 F.3d at 466.  Although the court did not find 
the argument completely persuasive, Playboy may indicate that technological advances 
would diminish the FCC’s constitutional oversight of the broadcast media.  Id.  See generally 
Marie A. Ryan, Note, To V or Not to V—That is the Regulatory Question:  The Role of the V-
Chip in Government Regulation of Broadcast and Cable Indecency, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 
168–75 (1997) (providing a general background of the V-chip’s development). 
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court declined to part from Supreme Court precedent that has repeatedly 
recognized a different standard for broadcast media.97  As a result, the 
Second Circuit invalidated the FCC’s policy on administrative law 
grounds, but only expressed constitutional doubts.98 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit on 
administrative grounds.99  The Court found that the FCC had 
acknowledged a change from prior policy and provided rational 
justification for the change.100  Specifically, the Court said that it made 
sense not to distinguish between literal and non-literal uses of expletives, 
that it was within the Supreme Court’s holding in Pacifica to consider the 
patent offensiveness of isolated expletives, and that it was logical “that a 
safe harbor for single words would ‘likely lead to more widespread use 
of the offensive language.’”101  The Court declined to decide the 
constitutional issues, but noted the possibility that the FCC’s policy 
could be unconstitutional.102  In closing, the Court stated:  “The 
                                                 
97 Fox, 489 F.3d at 465.  See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 867 (“[A]s a matter of history [the 
broadcast media have] ‘received the most limited First Amendment protection . . . .”) 
(quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748). 
98 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 467 (“[W]e are doubtful that the by merely proffering a reasoned 
analysis for its new approach to indecency and profanity, the Commission can adequately 
respond to the constitutional and statutory challenges raised by the Network 
[Broadcasters].”). 
99 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox II), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009).  First, the 
Court rejected the Second Circuit’s application of a heightened standard to changes in 
administrative policy, stating that “[w]e find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act 
or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching 
review.”  Id. at 1810.  Second, the Court made clear that it would not “apply a more 
stringent arbitrary-and-capricious review to agency actions that implicate constitutional 
liberties.”  Id. at 1811. 
100 Id. at 1812 ( “There is no doubt that the Commission knew it was making a change.”). 
101 Id. at 1813 (quoting Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their 
Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program (Golden Globe Awards), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 
(2004) (memorandum opinion and order)).  Additionally, the Court rejected the Second 
Circuit’s reasoning that the FCC’s “first blow” theory of harm was unsupported.  Id.  The 
Court stated that empirical evidence of harm was not necessary, but that “it suffice[d] to 
know that children mimic the behavior.”  Id.  The Court noted that the FCC produced no 
evidence of quantifiable harm in Pacifica, but the Court found then, as in Fox II, that the 
government’s interest in the well-being of children justified regulation.  Id.  The Court also 
rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning that the “‘first blow’ theory of harm would require 
a categorical ban on all broadcasts of expletives.”  Id. at 1814.  This reasoning was 
undermined by the FCC’s actual practice and prior context-based policy, and would be 
better directed at an attack on the context-based system, not the fleeting expletive policy.  
Id.  Finally, the Court agreed with the FCC that “complete immunity for fleeting expletives, 
ardently desired by broadcasters, [would logically] lead to a substantial increase in fleeting 
expletives.”  Id. 
102 Id. at 1819 (“It is conceivable that the Commission’s orders may cause some 
broadcasters to avoid certain language that is beyond the Commission’s reach under the 
Constitution.”).  The Court would not decide the issue without a lower court’s opinion.  Id. 
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Commission could reasonably conclude that the pervasiveness of foul 
language, and the coarsening of public entertainment in other media 
such as cable, justify more stringent regulation of broadcast programs so 
as to give conscientious parents a relatively safe haven for their 
children.”103 
Congress created the FCC to regulate the broadcast airwaves for the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity.104  As part of this mandate, 
the FCC has regulated broadcast indecency through safe harbor times 
and a complaint-driven indecency policy, and these policies have been 
given deference based on the broadcast medium’s uniquely pervasive 
nature and accessibility to children.105  The FCC has also acted under this 
mandate to change the way in which it regulates fleeting indecency, but 
these changes are unconstitutional and have been met strongly by 
critics.106 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Since the passage of the Radio Act in 1927, the FCC has been 
entrusted to regulate the broadcast airwaves for the public convenience, 
interest, and necessity.107  The scarcity of resources, the uniquely 
pervasive nature of the broadcast media, and the government’s interest 
in protecting children have each greatly shaped broadcast indecency 
policies and have served as justifications for providing less First 
Amendment protection to broadcasters.108  Part III.A explains that the 
FCC’s attempted policy on fleeting indecency exceeds constitutional 
                                                 
103 Id. (finding that the Second Circuit disagreed with the FCC’s policy choices, but that 
the Court could not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency). 
104 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (discussing legislation that created the 
FCC). 
105 See generally Genelle I. Belmas et. al., In the Dark:  A Consumer Perspective on FCC 
Broadcast Indecency Denials, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 67, 74 (2007) (discussing the complaint 
process); How the FCC Resolves Obscenity/Indecency/Profanity Complaints, 
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/flow.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2009); supra discussion Part II.B 
(discussing the development of indecency policy including safe harbor provisions).  Belmas 
undertook the first systematic review of consumer complaints denied by the FCC.  Belmas, 
supra at 105.  Belmas found “that profanity in lyrics, conversation, or dialogue, along with 
sexual material and nudity, are of major concern to . . . American viewers and listeners,” 
though “many Americans lack understanding of the functions or regulatory powers of the 
FCC.”  Id. at 99. 
106 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007); infra Part III.B 
(discussing criticism of FCC regulations). 
107 See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (describing the public factors under 
which the FCC regulates). 
108 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (discussing pervasive quality of 
media and the government’s interest in protecting children); supra notes 43–44 and 
accompanying text (describing scarcity rationale). 
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boundaries because it does not properly protect against the arbitrary 
discretion of the FCC in determining what speech is indecent.109  Part 
III.B discusses how Congress’s continuing mandate that the FCC 
regulate for the public convenience, interest, and necessity requires that 
the FCC regulate broadcast indecency despite arguments from the 
broadcast networks and scholars that broadcast indecency regulation is 
no longer justified.110  Part III.C illustrates that if, alternatively, the critics 
prevail and broadcast indecency regulation is subjected to strict scrutiny 
like other media, the FCC’s policy could survive a facial challenge.111 
A. The FCC’s Fleeting Indecency Policy Affords the FCC an Unconstitutional 
Level of Discretion 
In 2004, the FCC changed its established policy to include the 
regulation of fleeting materials.112  One criticism is that the application of 
the new policy is inconsistent and in conflict with the First 
Amendment.113  For example, in Fox v. FCC, the Second Circuit was 
skeptical that the FCC’s fleeting indecency policy could pass 
constitutional muster.114  The Second Circuit was correct that the FCC 
cannot mandate that some words meet the first prong of the indecency 
test per se because this change removed the barrier that prevented the 
FCC from arbitrarily using discretion to determine what speech is 
indecent.115 
In Fox, the Second Circuit questioned the FCC’s determination that 
some words were per se sexual or excretory under the first prong of the 
indecency policy because it could permit the FCC to “sanction speech 
based on its subjective view of the merit of that speech.”116  This concept 
                                                 
109 See infra Part III.A (discussing how per se determination of the first prong gives the 
FCC too much discretion). 
110 See infra Part III.B (discussing that the Pacifica justifications still serve as valid bases for 
deferential treatment of broadcast indecency regulation). 
111 See infra Part III.C (discussing how the FCC could regulate broadcast indecency and 
still meet strict scrutiny); supra note 52 (differentiating between an “as applied” and 
“facial” challenge). 
112 See supra  Parts II.B–C (describing prior policy and the changes). 
113 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) (questioning the 
constitutionality of the FCC’s indecency policy). 
114 Fox, 489 F.3d at 464 (“[T]he FCC’s indecency test raises the separate constitutional 
question of whether it permits the FCC to sanction speech based on its subjective view of 
the merit of that speech.”). 
115 See id. (discussing that the policy may give the FCC too much discretion). 
116 Id. (stating that the networks need not prove the FCC subjectively “‘exercised its 
discretion in a content-based manner,’” but whether the policy prevented it from doing so) 
(quoting Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 n.10 (1992)).  In 
Fox, the Second Circuit questioned the constitutionality of these changes based on 
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was borrowed from the licensing context, in which, to constitute a valid 
prior restraint, there must be an important government interest in 
licensing, there must be “clear criteria leaving almost no discretion to the 
licensing authority,” and “there must be procedural safeguards.”117  
While the FCC’s policy is not a prior restraint, the concept provides a 
useful framework for evaluating the FCC’s per se indecency policy.118 
In applying this framework to the FCC’s per se indecency policy, the 
FCC has two important reasons for regulating indecent broadcasts:  the 
pervasiveness of broadcasting and broadcasting’s unique accessibility to 
children.119  In addition, the FCC’s indecency regulations do have 
procedural safeguards.120  However, the second requirement of a valid 
prior restraint is not met by the FCC when it determines that some 
words are inherently sexual or excretory in nature, because the second 
factor of the FCC’s indecency test alone vests too much discretion in the 
FCC.121 
Prior to 2004, the FCC’s indecency policy set out clear criteria that 
prevented an abuse of discretion by including an objective prong that 
limited the subjective decision-making of the FCC.122  Under that policy, 
the FCC first objectively determined whether the challenged material 
depicted sexual or excretory organs or activities.123  Because material that 
was not determined to be objectively sexual or excretory in nature would 
be dismissed as protected speech, this prong of the indecency test served 
                                                                                                             
precedent from the licensing context.  Id.  In the licensing context, the Supreme Court has 
invalidated speech regulations that give too much discretion to government officials.  Id. 
117 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 95, at 964–65.  These criteria are applied when licensing is 
used as a prior restraint.  Id. at 964.  See generally Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 
550 (1993) (“‘[P]rior restraints’ [are] ‘administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain 
communications when issued advance of the time that such communications are to 
occur.’”) (quoting NIMMER, supra note 95, § 4.03). 
118 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 464 (applying the licensing prior restraint framework to question 
the constitutionality of the FCC’s indecency policy). 
119 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978). 
120 See generally How the FCC Resolves Obscenity/Indecency/Profanity Complaints, 
supra note 105.  The FCC’s process is based upon consumer complaints.  Id.  The 
Commission reviews complaints and either publishes an order dismissing the complaint or 
issues a Notice of Apparent Liability to the broadcaster in question.  Id.  The broadcaster’s 
response is analyzed, and the FCC then either dismisses the complaint or issues a 
Forfeiture Order granting the complaint.  Id.  The broadcaster may challenge the Forfeiture 
Order by an appeal to the federal courts of appeals.  See 47 U.S.C. § 402 (2006) (describing 
the administrative policies for judicial review of an agency decision). 
121 See generally Fox, 489 F.3d at 464 (questioning whether the FCC has too much 
discretion under the policy). 
122 See Indus. Guidance on the Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & 
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broads. Indecency (2001 Industry Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R. 
7999, 8002 (2001) (policy statement). 
123 Id. para. 7, at 8002. 
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as an important barrier against the contextual analysis of the second 
prong.124  Under the more subjective second prong, the FCC determined 
whether the material was patently offensive under contemporary 
community standards, and “the full context in which the material 
appeared [was] critically important.”125  The limitless variety of possible 
broadcasts required that the FCC be more flexible and subjective when 
determining this prong.126  Together, both questions ensured that the 
FCC did not exercise its regulatory power arbitrarily.127 
However, in 2004 when the FCC determined that all uses of “fuck” 
and “shit” were inherently sexual or excretory in nature, it removed the 
objective step that prevented the FCC from basing its regulatory 
decisions solely on subjective discretion.128  Without that barrier, the 
FCC’s indecency policy becomes a one-step determination based on its 
interpretation of the factors, which could be based solely on a 
determination of the speech’s merit.129  The FCC might not consistently 
                                                 
124 Id. para. 8, at 8002 (citing WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 1838, 
1840–41 (2000)).  See also How the FCC Resolves Obscenity/Indecency/Profanity 
Complaints, supra note 105. 
125 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 9, at 8002.  See supra text accompanying note 
72 (citing id. para. 10, at 8003, which states the factors considered when applying this 
contextual approach). 
126 See id. para. 9, at 8003 (“[C]ontextual determinations are necessarily highly fact-
specific, making it difficult to catalog comprehensively all of the possible contextual factors 
that might exacerbate or mitigate the patent offensiveness of particular material.”). 
127 See id. paras. 7–9, at 8002–03. 
128 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 464 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing 
concern that current FCC indecency test gives too much discretion to the FCC); Complaints 
Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” 
Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, para. 8, at 4978 (2004) (memorandum opinion and order) 
(finding variations of the word “fuck” to be presumptively sexual in nature); Complaints 
Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 
2664, para. 74, at 2684 (2006) (notices of apparent liability) (finding variations of the word 
“shit” to be presumptively excretory in nature).  But see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 
(Fox II), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1814 (2009) (noting that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the 
FCC to maintain some discretion through its context-based policy).  The Supreme Court in 
Fox II noted that the FCC’s policy of using context to determine whether fleeting expletives 
were indecent was not arbitrary and capricious.  Id.  While under administrative law the 
policy change was not arbitrary and capricious, the Court failed to note that the per se 
policy did not just allow the FCC to retain “some” discretion, but the FCC transformed the 
indecency policy into a purely subjective test.  See id.  The Court did not respond to the 
Second Circuit’s speculation that the policy could be unconstitutional under this theory.  
See id. at 1818. 
129 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 464 (stating that the FCC’s policy may give it the discretion to 
“sanction speech based on its subjective view of the merit of that speech”); 2001 Industry 
Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 8, at 8003 (applying contemporary community standards of the 
broadcast medium).  See also Quale, supra note 15, at 230.  Quale states that the second 
prong of the policy is flawed, because “‘contemporary community standards’ become 
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abuse its power, but it has created that “pervasive threat inherent in [the 
censor’s] very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of 
discussion.”130  Because of this danger, the FCC must eliminate the policy 
that variations of “fuck” and “shit” are inherently sexual or excretory in 
nature.131  Although the FCC’s current indecency policy gives the FCC 
too much discretion, the general regulation of broadcast indecency is still 
required, because it serves the public interest.132 
B. Regulating Broadcast Indecency for the Public Interest, Convenience, and 
Necessity 
Critics of broadcast indecency regulation argue that the justifications 
for regulating the content of the broadcast media are no longer valid.133  
Thus, it is argued that like the regulation of other media, the regulation 
of broadcast indecency must meet strict scrutiny.134  While the scarcity 
rationale is no longer a relevant justification for allowing the FCC to 
regulate broadcast indecency, the basic rationales articulated in Pacifica 
are still valid.135  As such, the public interest, convenience, and necessity 
require that broadcast indecency regulation still be evaluated under a 
deferential scrutiny by the judiciary.136 
The scarcity rationale was the traditional basis for the broadcast 
industry’s limited First Amendment protection.137  The broadcast 
industry, scholars, and even the FCC, have acknowledged that the 
scarcity rationale is no longer a valid basis for indecency regulation.138  
                                                                                                             
solely what organized interest groups, FCC staffers, and FCC Commissioners find patently 
offensive” and the opinion of the average viewer or complainant is ignored.  Id. 
130 Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 n.10 (1992) (quoting 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)). 
131 See infra Part IV (proposing new policy that eliminates the per se policy under the first 
prong). 
132 See infra discussion Part III.B (defending the justifications for regulating broadcast 
indecency). 
133 See infra discussion Part III.B (describing arguments against the regulation of 
broadcast indecency). 
134 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 465 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is increasingly difficult to describe the 
broadcast media as uniquely pervasive and uniquely accessible to children, and at some 
point in the future, strict scrutiny may properly apply in the context of regulating 
broadcast television.”). 
135 See infra notes 150–60 and accompanying text (discussing that broadcast television is 
still uniquely pervasive and accessible to children). 
136 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“And of all forms of 
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment 
protection.”). 
137 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that the scarcity 
rationale permits the government to regulate the access and use of the broadcast airwaves). 
138  See Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, para. 11, at 2699 (1987) (memorandum 
opinion and order) (“[W]e no longer consider the argument of spectrum scarcity to provide 
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From an economic standpoint, it is argued that any good or service in 
great demand is scarce, so that the broadcast spectrum is no different 
than print media.139  From a technological standpoint, it is argued that 
the proliferation of media choices has made broadcast television 
irrelevant or, at least, no longer unique.140  However, even if the scarcity 
rationale no longer distinguishes broadcasting from other types of 
media, a lack of scarcity does not eviscerate the distinct and unique 
properties of the broadcast media recognized in Pacifica.141 
In Pacifica, the Supreme Court distinguished the broadcast media 
because it was uniquely pervasive and accessible to children.142  
Recently, these justifications have been criticized for being out of sync 
with modern life and unsupported by actual harm.143  A comprehensive 
                                                                                                             
a sufficient basis for [indecency] regulation.”); ZELEZNY, supra note 35, at 360 (stating the 
argument that the marketplace is full of channels of communication, broadcasting and 
otherwise); Krotoszynski, supra note 59, at 929 (“Even at its inception, the scarcity rationale 
was not a particularly powerful justification for affording broadcasters degraded First 
Amendment rights.”). 
139 Krotoszynski, supra note 59, at 929 (“The underlying economic reality is that if any 
input in providing a good or service commands a price greater than zero, it is ‘scarce’ in 
economic terms and limits market entry.”). 
140 Id. at 932 (“[T]he ability to distribute programming free and clear of television and 
radio stations makes their importance as a means of disseminating information and ideas 
far less important a concern in 2008 than was the case in 1968—or even 1998.”); Holohan, 
supra note 59, at 366 (“Because technological developments have blurred the distinction 
between broadcast and non-broadcast electronic media, differing treatment of these forms 
of communication is no longer legally defensible.”).  For example, in the 1960s, when Red 
Lion was decided, there were approximately 700 television stations in the United States.  
ZELEZNY, supra note 35, at 360.  In 2002, there were 1700 television stations, in addition to 
the approximately 8000 cable television systems and the internet.  Id. 
141 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49.  The Pacifica Court stated: 
[T]he broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence 
in the lives of all Americans.  Patently offensive, indecent material 
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, 
but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be 
left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an 
intruder. . . . 
 Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even 
those too young to read. 
Id. 
142 Id. 
143 See JEFFREY MCCALL, VIEWER DISCRETION ADVISED:  TAKING CONTROL OF MASS MEDIA 
INFLUENCES 36 (2007) (discussing the arguments for and against “authentic” 
programming); Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcasting?  Toward a Consistent First 
Amendment Standard For the Information Age, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 431, 449 (2007) 
(criticizing the pervasiveness justification as “far too inclusive and [it] could be applied to 
any media outlet that is determined by regulators to be particularly pervasive in [people’s] 
lives”); Holohan, supra note 59, at 365 (“[N]one of the institutions leading the anti-
indecency crusade have identified any actual harm caused by objectionable 
programming.”). 
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study of broadcast television content between 1998 and 2007 by the 
Parents Television Council found that the use of harsh expletives had 
risen sharply during hours when children are in the audience.144  The 
broadcast industry recognizes that harsh language and content has 
increased, but defends such content as being reflective of modern life.145  
In response, supporters of broadcast regulation cite public polls that 
suggest a majority of respondents would favor stricter content policies, 
higher fines for violations, and indecency restrictions on cable.146  While 
public approval does not equate to constitutional approval, these polls 
do suggest that such programming is not indicative of modern life.147  
Moreover, even though many people may use coarse language, most 
recognize that it is often inappropriate.148  Because broadcast television is 
part of the public airwaves, mandating a certain level of decorum is 
justified.149 
Despite the evidence of offensive content, the broadcast industry 
also claims that any risk of harm to children by broadcasting has been 
undermined or completely repudiated since the time of Pacifica, and that 
no harm has been supported by evidence.150  However, recent studies 
have linked both broadcast and cable television usage with higher 
                                                 
144 Press Release, Parents Television Council, supra note 8.  The Parents Television 
Council analyzed all primetime television entertainment programs that were broadcast on 
the major networks between 1998 and 2007.  Id.  Moreover, the study found that harsher 
expletives were broadcast earlier in the day during 2007 than during 1998.  Id. 
145 See Eggerton, supra note 93.  News Corp. President and COO Peter Chernin said “Fox 
[will] fight to the end for [the] ability to put occasionally controversial, offensive, and even 
tasteless content on the air” because such programming is “provocative and accurately 
reflects our society.”  Id. 
146 MCCALL, supra note 143, at 47.  A Pew Research poll from 2005 found that seventy-
five percent of respondents wanted tighter enforcement on indecency, sixty-nine percent in 
favor of higher fines, and sixty percent in favor of holding cable accountable for indecency.  
Id.  See also Belmas, supra note 105, at 99 (stating that it is clear that indecent material is “of 
major concern to . . . American viewers and listeners who took the time to write a letter or 
note of complaint to the [FCC]”).  In 2005, Congress passed a bill that would increase the 
penalties for broadcasting indecent materials from a maximum of $25,000 per broadcast to 
$325,000 per broadcast.  Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-235, 
§ 2, 120 Stat. 491 (2005).  In 2007, legislation was introduced that would require the FCC to 
maintain a policy that a single word or image may be considered indecent.  Protecting 
Children from Indecent Programming Act, S. 1780, 110th Cong. (2007).  The statute was 
referred to committee, but has not been passed.  Id. 
147 See MCCALL, supra note 143, at 36.  McCall argues that primetime television is 
recognized by viewers as far from authentic.  Id. 
148 Id. at 36 (“Even the most lowbrow of speakers has the gumption to not use foul 
language in business settings . . . and in any setting for which proper decorum is 
expected.”). 
149 Id. 
150 See John Eggerton, Media Institute Weighs In On Indecency, BROAD. & CABLE, Aug. 8, 
2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6585792.html?nid=3343. 
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instances of teen sex and teen pregnancy, suggesting a correlation 
between broadcast television content and destructive behavior.151  That 
correlation supports the theory of protecting youth from indecent 
content by regulating broadcast indecency.152 
In addition, critics argue that because children have access to 
indecent material from a variety of unregulated sources, continuing to 
give FCC regulation of the broadcast industry deferential treatment is 
unfair.153  However, the Supreme Court has consistently distinguished 
broadcasting from other forms of media.154  In Fox, the networks argued 
that there was no basis for treating broadcast industry different from 
other forms of media, in part, because a majority of American 
households subscribe to cable or satellite television services.155  Yet, the 
argument that an abundance of media eliminates the need for regulating 
indecency wrongly assumes that parents or other viewers have an equal 
opportunity to affirmatively say “no” to broadcast material as they do 
with non-broadcast material.156  In Playboy, the Court differentiated cable 
                                                 
151 See Brown, supra note 90; Chandra, supra note 90, at 1052 (finding that “frequent 
exposure to sexual content on television predicts early pregnancy”).  Chandra selected 
programs from both broadcast and cable television that were popular with teens.  Chandra, 
supra note 90, at 1049.  Such programs included live-action, reality, sitcoms, dramas, and 
animated shows.  Id. 
152 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (stating that the government’s 
interest in the well-being of youth justified regulating broadcast indecency). 
153 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 466 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The 
proliferation of satellite and cable television channels—not to mention internet-based video 
outlets—has begun to erode the ‘uniqueness’ of broadcast media . . . .”); Eggerton, supra 
note 93. 
154 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (noting that the 
key difference between cable and broadcasting is that the option to block programming is 
absent from broadcasting); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997) (noting that “as a matter 
of history” the broadcast media have “received the most limited First Amendment 
protection,” and that the internet has no comparable history) (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 
867); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127–28 (1989) (stating that 
telephone services are different than broadcasting because it requires users to take an 
affirmative step, unlike broadcasting which is pervasive). 
155 Fox, 489 F.3d at 465 (“The Network [Broadcasters] contend[ed] that the bases for 
treating broadcast media ‘differently’ have eroded over time . . . .”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
156 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815; Fox, 489 F.3d at 466 n.14 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (2006) as 
mandating the placement of a blocking feature enabling viewers to filter commonly rated 
programs on their television.) This technology is commonly known as the V-chip, and it 
acts as a filter for individual programs of a chosen rating, which is distinguishable from 
blocking entire cable channels or declining cable service altogether.  See FCC, V-Chip:  
Viewing Television Responsibility, http://www.fcc.gov/vchip (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).  
The National Association of Broadcasters, the National Cable Television Association and 
the Motion Picture Association of America created a television ratings system, which was 
approved by the FCC.  See id.  See generally Ryan, supra note 96, at 168–75 (providing a 
general background of the V-chip’s development).  Playboy was decided in 2000, the year in 
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from broadcasting because cable users can block certain channels, and no 
comparable technology exists for broadcast television.157  In contrast, 
broadcast television is free, and viewers or listeners might become 
unwilling participants because “the airwaves confront[] the citizen, not 
only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the 
individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder.”158  In Pacifica, the Court rejected the 
argument that a viewer could simply turn off offending content to avoid 
further offense, and, despite the availability of other media forms, that 
statement is still correct.159  Unless and until viewers can affirmatively 
block broadcasts in a similar manner to non-broadcast media, an 
inherent difference between the forms exists.160 
Because the Pacifica justifications still exist, the FCC still has 
authority to regulate indecent content in broadcasting.161  Given the 
public’s opinion, Congress’s support, and studies of the ill-effects of 
indecent programming on children, the FCC should regulate indecent 
content on broadcast television to fulfill its duty to protect the public 
interest.162  Nonetheless, even if the Supreme Court were to apply strict 
scrutiny to broadcast indecency regulation, the FCC’s regulation should 
                                                                                                             
which the requirement of 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) became active.  See 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (2006); 
529 U.S. 803.  In Playboy, the Supreme Court still relied on a user’s ability to affirmatively 
block channels to differentiate between cable and broadcasting, which suggests the V-chip 
may not negate the pervasiveness of broadcasting.  See 529 U.S. at 815. 
157 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815 (“[T]argeted blocking enables the Government to support 
parental authority without affecting the First Amendment interests of speakers and willing 
listeners . . . .”).  See supra notes 96, 156 (discussing V-chip technology). 
158 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.  See also Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 
660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[B]roadcast audiences have no choice but to ‘subscribe’ to the entire 
output of traditional broadcasters.”); see Quale, supra note 15, at 207 (stating that 
broadcasting is an integral and free aspect of society). 
159 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49. 
160 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815.  In Fox, the Second Circuit asserted in dicta that V-chip 
technology would provide a less restrictive alternative than a total indecency ban.  489 F.3d 
at 466.  The court likened this technology to the choice viewers have with cable channels 
and suggested that this advancement could negate the FCC’s authority to regulate 
indecency.  Id.  The FCC argued that the V-chip is an ineffective alternative because “most 
parents do not know how to use it, programs are often inaccurately rated, and fleeting 
expletives . . . could elude V-chip blocking.”  Id.  Moreover, because of the deferential 
treatment afforded to broadcasters, a less restrictive alternative to regulation is not 
necessary.  See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726 (applying a deferential standard to broadcast media).  
161 See Eggerton, supra note 93 (stating that FCC should no longer regulate broadcast 
content). 
162 See supra notes 150–60 and accompanying text (defending the validity of broadcast 
indecency regulation). 
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still be upheld as serving a compelling interest through narrowly 
tailored means.163 
C. Why the FCC’s Indecency Regulation Passes Strict Scrutiny 
In Fox, the Second Circuit questioned whether it remained proper to 
view broadcast regulation under a deferential scrutiny.164  Even if the 
Second Circuit’s view were accepted, the regulation of broadcast 
indecency could survive strict scrutiny in a facial challenge.165  First, the 
justifications articulated in Pacifica would serve as the FCC’s compelling 
interests.166  Second, an indecency policy, and not the V-chip, could serve 
as the least restrictive means.167 
Congress has directed the FCC to act for the public’s interest, 
convenience, and necessity.168  The regulation of broadcast television is 
in the public’s interest, convenience, and necessity because of its 
uniquely pervasive presence in viewers’ homes and its accessibility to 
children.169  Because an indecent broadcast “confronts the citizen, not 
only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the 
individual’s right to be left alone” is paramount, the FCC has a 
compelling interest to regulate such broadcasts.170  In addition, the 
government has a compelling “interest in the well-being of its youth and 
in supporting parents’ claim to authority in their own household” 
because broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children.171  Thus, even if 
strict scrutiny is applied, the justifications that formerly served as a basis 
for deferential treatment should be recognized as compelling interests in 
the strict scrutiny analysis.172  The FCC must meet those interests with 
the least restrictive means.173 
                                                 
163 See supra notes 96 (discussing strict scrutiny). 
164 489 F.3d at 465. 
165 Id. (“[A]t some point in the future, strict scrutiny may properly apply in the context of 
regulating broadcast television.”). 
166 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) (stating that broadcasting is 
uniquely pervasive into the home and uniquely accessible to children). 
167 See infra notes 174–80 and accompanying text (discussing why an indecency policy, 
and not the V-chip, is the least restrictive means to serve the government’s compelling 
interests).  See also infra Part IV (proposing a new policy that could serve as the least 
restrictive means). 
168 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). 
169 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49. 
170 Id. at 748. 
171 Id. at 749 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
172 See supra notes 150–60 and accompanying text (discussing continuing validity of the 
Pacifica justifications). 
173 See infra notes 174–80 and accompanying text (discussing indecency regulation as least 
restrictive means). 
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In Fox v. FCC, the networks argued that, under strict scrutiny, the 
FCC could not regulate indecent broadcasts because the V-chip would 
serve as a lesser restrictive means.174  Assuming that parents understand 
how to use their V-chips and that the rating system is accurate, the V-
chip could be an effective tool for preventing children from viewing 
offensive content.175  However, the V-chip only addresses broadcasting’s 
unique accessibility to children because the V-chip’s purpose is to allow 
parents to control the content that their children can view based on 
ratings.176  The V-chip does not adequately address broadcasting’s 
pervasiveness because it can do nothing to prevent indecent content that 
violates the safe harbor provisions or slips through the ratings system.177  
Moreover, while protecting children is an important interest, broadcast 
television invades the privacy of the home for both adults and children, 
and it should not be expected that adults would use the V-chip to avoid 
unwanted indecent content broadcast on the public airwaves.178  The V-
chip’s deficiencies would make it difficult for a challenger to argue that 
the V-chip is the least restrictive means under all circumstances.179  Thus, 
in order for the FCC to truly address both the interests of privacy in 
one’s home and protecting children from indecent broadcasts, the FCC 
must be able to take action against those who violate the indecency 
regulations.180 
The FCC’s current indecency policy is unconstitutional because it 
gives the FCC too much discretion in determining what material is 
indecent and thus, unprotected.181  However, the public interest still 
                                                 
174 489 F.3d 444, 466 (2d Cir. 2007) (basing this argument on Playboy).  In United States v. 
Playboy, the FCC could not require the scrambling of certain channels because parents were 
able to request that the cable company block offending channels.  529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).  
However, the use of the V-chip is distinguishable from the blocking technology in Playboy 
because the issue with cable was certain indecent channels, not individual programs of a 
certain rating.  See id. 
175 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 466 (stating that the FCC viewed the V-chip as an ineffective tool 
because parents do not know how to use it and the ratings system could miss fleeting 
expletives). 
176 See generally FCC, V-Chip:  Viewing Television Responsibility, supra note 156. 
177 See generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2008) (safe harbor rule); Action for Children’s 
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding safe harbor times). 
178 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“[I]ndecent material presented 
over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the 
home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment 
rights of an intruder.”). 
179 See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187 (2008) (“[A] facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute requires a showing that no set of circumstances exist under 
which the statute would be valid . . . .”). 
180 See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49 (discussing the justifications for treating the 
broadcast medium differently). 
181 See supra discussion Part III.A (discussing that first prong is unconstitutional). 
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requires that indecent broadcasts be regulated due to broadcasting’s 
continuing pervasiveness and accessibility to children.182  Even if strict 
scrutiny is applied, the FCC has compelling interests for regulating 
broadcast indecency, and an indecency policy would be the least 
restrictive means.183  Based on the foregoing, the FCC must revise its 
current indecency policy to continue protecting the public’s convenience, 
interest, and necessity; to remedy the constitutional problems with the 
FCC’s indecency policy; and to protect broadcasters’ free speech by 
putting them on clear notice of what type of content should be 
avoided.184 
IV.  A PROPOSED POLICY FOR REGULATING BROADCAST INDECENCY 
Despite a barrage of criticism from broadcasters, scholars, and 
courts, the FCC must still regulate broadcast indecency for the public 
interest.185  The FCC adequately can address its concern for fleeting 
indecency through the application of its contextual approach, but the 
FCC’s policy of per se sexual or excretory words is unconstitutional 
because it allows for arbitrary discretion of power.186  Moreover, due to 
the litigation invalidating much of the FCC’s most recent policy, it is 
unclear what policy broadcasters will be responsible for following.187  In 
response, Part IV proposes a new indecency policy to correct the 
constitutional problems and to give clear guidance to the industry.188   
In the interests of clarity and of avoiding constitutional problems, 
the FCC must revisit its indecency policy.189  First, the FCC must retain 
an objective step in its indecency analysis by returning to its 2001 
interpretation of the first prong of its indecency test and eliminating per 
se determinations of some words.190  Thus, the first step in the FCC’s 
                                                 
182 See supra discussion Part III.B (discussing that public interest requires broadcast 
regulation). 
183 See supra discussion Part III.C (discussing why broadcast regulation could meet strict 
scrutiny). 
184 See infra Part IV (proposing new policy). 
185 See supra Part III.B (discussing that Pacifica’s justifications are still valid as bases for the 
FCC’s indecency regime).  
186 See supra text accompanying notes 82–84 (stating that fleeting utterances are not 
insulated from the contextual approach); Part III.A (discussing constitutionality of per se 
indecency policy). 
187 See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 
489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
188 See infra Part IV (proposing new policy). 
189 See supra text accompanying notes 186–87 (discussing why FCC must revise its 
policy).  See also Belmas, supra note 105, at 102 (suggesting that the FCC create and 
publicize “clear, defensible indecency guidelines”). 
190 See Indus. Guidance on the Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & 
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency (2001 Industry Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R 
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indecency analysis simply should ask whether the challenged material 
describes or depicts sexual or excretory functions.191  Second, the FCC 
must revise its second prong of the indecency test, which the FCC 
described in 2001 as asking whether the challenged material was 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards 
for the broadcast medium.192  The FCC provides three factors to aid in its 
determination and has defined the standard as “that of an average 
broadcast viewer or listener and not the sensibilities of any individual 
complainant.”193  In order to provide clearer guidance to the industry, 
the FCC should revise this second prong of the indecency analysis.194 
In its revision of the indecency test’s second prong, the FCC should 
incorporate the contextual factors into the main text of the policy, placing 
greater weight on explicitness and shock value.195  Thus, the policy 
would better protect against the language that is explicit or shocking for 
no valuable purpose.196  In addition, the FCC should revise the 
“contemporary community standard” language to better reflect the 
subjective and contextual approach of the second prong.197  The new 
policy should include the perspective of the reasonable viewer and 
mention the importance of the complaint process in indecency 
enforcement.198 
Below, the proposed indecency policy is printed in full: 
1) The material in the broadcast must fall within the 
subject matter scope of the indecency definition—that is, 
                                                                                                             
7999, para. 7, at 8002 (2001) (policy statement) (“[T]he material alleged to be indecent must 
fall within the subject matter scope of our indecency definition—that is, the material must 
describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities.”). 
191 See id. (describing the first prong of the indecency test). 
192 Id. para.8, at 8002 (stating that under the second prong, broadcasts must be “patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium”). 
193 Id.  The three factors are: 
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of 
sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells 
on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or 
activities; [and] (3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to 
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been presented for its shock 
value. 
Id. para. 10, at 8003. 
194 See infra text accompanying note 199 (proposing revisions to the indecency test). 
195 See generally 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 10, at 8003 (listing factors). 
196 See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (stating that indecent 
words offend for the same reason obscene material offends). 
197 See generally 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 8, at 8002 (describing 
contemporary community standard). 
198 See generally FCC, Complaint Process, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/process.html (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2009) (describing the FCC’s complaint process). 
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the material must describe or depict sexual or excretory 
organs or activities. 
2) The broadcast must be patently offensive as measured 
by the reasonable broadcast viewer. 
i) Although the sensibilities of any individual 
complainant will not be given excessive weight, the 
number of complaints about the specific broadcast 
will be taken into the final consideration. 
3) When determining whether material is patently 
offensive, the Commission will focus on the explicitness or 
graphic nature of the material.  Material that is presented 
gratuitously or for its own shock value will not be considered 
valuable speech. 
4) Fleeting instances of material that describe or depict sexual 
or excretory organs or activities will not be immune from 
regulation if the overall broadcast is found to be patently 
offensive. 
i) We note that technological advances have made it 
possible as a general matter to prevent the broadcast 
of a single offending word or action without 
blocking or disproportionately disrupting the 
message of the speaker or performer.  
ii) The use of the technological advancements discussed in 
paragraph (4)(i) is strongly encouraged during live 
broadcasts. 199 
This policy, although longer than the current two-prong indecency 
test, provides clearer guidelines and puts broadcasters on sufficient 
notice in regard to the importance of the contextual factors.200  It also 
puts broadcasters on clear notice that fleeting instances of indecent 
material are subject to regulation.201  Although this policy addresses the 
                                                 
199 Material in normal typeface is paraphrased from 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. 
7999 and Complaints Against Various Broadcasts Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden 
Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) (memorandum opinion and order).  
Material in italic typeface is the proposed changes of the author. 
200 Compare 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 7–8, at 8002 (two-prong policy), with 
supra text accompanying note 199 (proposed policy).  Critics may argue that this policy 
does not differ substantially enough from the current policy, except for eliminating the per 
se determination under the first prong.  However, by explicitly incorporating the FCC’s 
interpretive guidance into the actual policy, a clearer and less discretionary policy is 
created. 
201 See supra text accompanying note 199 (proposed policy). 
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issues identified above, to give the policy more weight, the FCC should 
introduce the policy as a proposed federal rule.202 
Codifying a federal rule is desirable for broadcast indecency 
regulation because the process requires public notice and solicitation of 
the public’s comments.203  Following this procedure will enable the FCC 
to solicit input from the public, thus truly considering the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity.204  In addition, the broadcast media would 
also be involved in the process, which will not only put them on clear 
notice, but also will ensure that the opinions of the industry are taken 
fully into consideration.205  Finally, if the FCC’s indecency policy was 
incorporated into a federal rule, it would ensure that the FCC could not 
unilaterally change its policy.206  If the FCC enacted the proposed policy, 
it would remedy the constitutional problems with the current indecency 
policy and protect broadcasters’ free speech by putting them on clear 
notice of what type of content should be avoided.207 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In 1961, then FCC Chairman Minow concluded his speech to the 
National Association of Broadcasters with the following words: 
 Television and all who participate in it are jointly 
accountable to the American public for respect for the 
special needs of children, for community responsibility, 
for the advancement of education and culture, for the 
acceptability of the program materials chosen, for 
decency and decorum in production, and for propriety 
in advertising. This responsibility cannot be discharged 
by any given group of programs, but can be discharged 
only through the highest standards of respect for the 
American home, applied to every moment of every 
program presented by television. 
                                                 
202 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (agency rule making procedure).  Agencies must publish 
notice of the proposed rule in the Federal Register, solicit public comment on the proposed 
rule, and consider the public’s response before publishing a final rule.  Id. 
203 See generally id. 
204 See generally id. 
205 See generally Eggerton, supra note 93 (discussing media executive’s displeasure with 
the FCC); Eggerton, supra note 150 (discussing media organization’s displeasure with the 
FCC). 
206 See 5 U.S.C. § 553.  The notice and comment procedure acts as an additional safeguard 
against arbitrary policy changes.  See Administrative Procedure Act, Id. § 706(2)(A) (2006) 
(stating that reviewing courts shall set aside agency actions which are arbitrary and 
capricious). 
207 See supra text accompanying note 199 (proposed policy). 
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 Program materials should enlarge the horizons of 
the viewer, provide him with wholesome entertainment, 
afford helpful stimulation, and remind him of the 
responsibilities which the citizen has toward his 
society.208 
Despite the passage of forty-eight years, these words still serve as 
pertinent advice to television broadcasters.  Television does not always 
meet the standards described by Chairman Minow, and, as a result, the 
FCC’s indecency regulation acts as a check on broadcasters to ensure that 
the public’s interest, convenience, and necessity are being served.  To 
serve that end, the FCC must enact a policy that remedies the 
constitutional problems with the FCC’s current indecency policy and 
protects broadcasters’ free speech by putting them on clear notice of 
what type of content should be avoided.209  Ideally, the broadcast 
networks would then aspire to provide the public with better content, 
not in the vein of self-censorship, but with the purpose of serving 
society. 
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208 Minow, supra note 1, at 404 (reading from the National Association for Broadcasters’ 
television code). 
209 See supra text accompanying note 199 (proposed policy). 
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